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DARFUR, STATE DIVESTMENT INITIATIVES,
AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Lucien J. Dhooget
While the situation on Darfur is undoubtedly tragic, the U.S.
business community opposes the politicization of U.S. capital
markets.'
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Introduction
On June 25, 2005, Rod R. Blagojevich, the governor of
Illinois, signed Senate Bill 23.2 Designated as the "Act to End
t Associate Professor of Business Law, Eberhardt School of Business, University
of the Pacific, Stockton, CA. This article shares a factual foundation, introductory
language, and some conclusions with a previous article written by the author entitled
Condemning Khartoum: The Illinois Divestment Act and Foreign Relations, 43 AM. Bus.
L.J. 245 (2006).
I Letter from William A. Reinsch, President, Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, to
Albio Sires, Speaker, N.J. Assembly at 8 (Apr. 12, 2005), available at
http://www.nftc.org/default/councii%20highlights/2005/June-July%202005.pdf.
2 Press Release, Office of the Ill. Governor, Governor Ends State Investment in
Sudan (June 25, 2005), available at http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/Show
PressRelease.cfm?SubjectlD=l&RecNum=4097; see also Erika Slife, State to Bar Deals
with Sudan-Linked Firms, CHI. TRIB., June 25, 2005, at 17.
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Atrocities and Terrorism in the Sudan," Senate Bill 23 amended
the Deposit of State Moneys Act 3 and the Illinois Pension Code4 to
prohibit state investment in both the government of Sudan and in
companies doing business in or with the country of Sudan.5 Fund
managers responsible for Illinois' state pension and retirement
funds were given eighteen months to divest from such companies.6
Legislative sponsors of the Act cited Illinois as the first state in the
United States to terminate its investments in South Africa in
response to the system of apartheid as well as to the widespread
commission of human rights violations by the Sudanese
government. 7 Governor Blagojevich echoed these sentiments in a
statement issued at the time of his signing of the Act wherein he
stated: "[t]his bill sends a clear message to the Sudanese
government - the people of Illinois will not condone human
rights abuses and genocide, we will take our money elsewhere.",8
Governor Blagojevich also urged other states to adopt similar
legislation in order to "show Sudan that we take human rights
abuses seriously." 9  Several states had in fact adopted similar
legislation prior to Governor Blagojevich's signature of Senate
Bill 23. California and Louisiana adopted legislation in April and
May 2005 respectively, New Jersey and Oregon followed in July
and August 2005 respectively, and Connecticut followed in May
2006.'0 These efforts could ultimately impact $24 billion of the
3 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/0.01-23 (2006).
4 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-101-20 (2006).
5 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/22.6(b)(1-5) (2006); 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.5
(b)(1-6) (2006). The amendments will be referred to collectively as the Illinois Act or
the Act throughout this article.
6 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.5(a)(3) (2006).
7 Press Release, Office of the I11. Governor, supra note 2 (quoting I11. State
Senator Jacqueline Collins as stating "[t]his is a piece of legislation that really grew out
of my belief that we have a moral obligation to stand against oppression when we see it.
Our humanity diminishes whenever we profit from the slaughter and suffering of
others."). Ill. State Representative Lovana Collins characterized the Act as "uphold[ing]
our pact with the people to defend human rights and safeguard their tax dollars." Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 CAL. GOV. CODE § 7513.6(b) (2006) (providing that the Bd. of Admin. of the
Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. or the Teachers' Ret. Bd. of the State Teachers' Ret. Sys.
"shall not invest public employee retirement funds in a company with business
operations in Sudan" that meets certain criteria); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-37 (2006)
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$91 billion invested by state retirement systems in companies
doing business in Sudan.1 The divestment movement was not
limited to state governments; colleges and universities throughout
the United States also reviewed their portfolios.12
The motivation for the Illinois Act was the ongoing
humanitarian crisis in the Sudanese province of Darfur. 13 The
immediate cause of this crisis was the response of the Sudanese
government to two rebel movements, the Sudan Liberation Army
provides that the state treasurer "may divest, decide not to further invest state funds or
not enter into any future investment in any company doing business in Sudan, and shall
divest and not further invest in any security or instrument issued by Sudan"; LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 11:263(F) (2001) provides that the [state retirement system board of
trustees] "may but is not required to divest itself of any holding in a company having
facilities or employees or both located in a prohibited nation". "Prohibited nation" is
defined to include Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Id. § 352(B)(2); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 52:89.9-.11 (West 2005) prohibits the investment of assets of any state
pension or annuity fund in "any foreign company with an equity tie to [sic] government
of Sudan or its instrumentalities and is engaged in business in or with the same" and
requiring redemption, divestment, or withdrawal of existing investments in such
companies by July 2008; OR. REV. STAT. § 293.701-820 (2005) empowers the Oregon
Investment Council and the State Treasurer to divest state investment funds in companies
doing business in Sudan.
11 See GENOCIDE INTERVENTION FUND, AMOUNT INVESTED BY RETIREMENT
SYSTEMS IN SUDAN 1-2 (2005), available at http://www.sudancampaign.coml
sudaninvestments.htm.
12 Amy Borrus, Hitting Sudan in the Pocketbook; Pension Funds are Taking Notice
of a Growing Push to Cut Ties to the Rogue State, Bus. WK., May 2, 2005, at 72
(discussing the April 2005 decision of Harvard's Corporation Committee on Shareholder
Responsibility to divest $4.4 million in stock in PetroChina Company, whose parent
company is a major participant in Sudanese oil development); see also Stanford
University to Divest From Sudan, L.A. TIMES, June 10, 2005, at B4, reporting that
Stanford University would divest any "direct stock investments it holds in four
international energy companies with business ties to the government" of Sudan; Jim
Doyle, UC May Divest from Firms Operating in Sudan, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 15, 2006, at
B4 (discussing the pending decision of the Board of Regents of the University of
California to divest $100 million from oil and gas companies doing business in Sudan);
Press Release, Yale University, Yale Acts to Divest in Response to Darfur Genocide
(Feb. 15, 2006), available at http://www.yale.edu/opa/newsr/06-02-15-07.all.html.
13 As the largest region in the largest state in Africa, Darfur borders Libya, Chad,
and the Central African Republic. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK 2
(2005) [hereinafter CIA]; see also HUM. RTS. WATCH, DARFUR DESTROYED: ETHNIC
CLEANSING BY GOVERNMENT AND MILITIA FORCES IN WESTERN SUDAN 5 (2004)
[hereinafter DARFUR DESTROYED]. Darfur was divided into South, West, and North
regions in 1994. Id. Any reference to "Darfur" in this article will refer to the entire
region unless otherwise specified.
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(SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). 14 After
attacks by these rebel movements on government interests in
Darfur in 2003, the Sudanese government armed, trained, and
deployed local Arab militias known as "Janjaweed." 15 The
Janjaweed and Sudanese armed forces commenced a campaign of
ethnic cleansing and forced displacement of the civilian population
of Darfur through aerial bombing and burning of villages, murder,
and rape. 16 According to Human Rights Watch, 2,000,000
civilians were forcibly displaced, 2000 villages were destroyed,
and 70,000 people died as a result of these campaigns. 17 In
addition to the violence perpetrated upon the people of Darfur, the
Sudanese military and Janjaweed poisoned wells, plundered crops
and cattle, and obstructed the delivery of food, shelter, and
medicine to affected populations.18
The Illinois Act has proven very controversial. In addition to
the foreign relations implications of the Act,19 critics concluded
14 HUM. RTS. WATCH, WORLD REPORT, SUDAN, OVERVIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE
IN SUDAN 166, 166 (2005) [hereinafter SUDAN OVERVIEW].
15 There are numerous spellings of "Janjaweed." This article will utilize the
spelling set forth in the previous sentence and accompanying text. The term
"Janjaweed" refers to armed horsemen as well as outlaw groups in general. HUM. RTS.
WATCH, DARFUR IN FLAMES: ATROCITIES IN WESTERN SUDAN 8 n.5 (2004) [hereinafter
DARFUR IN FLAMES].
16 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, SUDAN 1 (2005) [hereinafter STATE
DEPARTMENT REPORT]; see also SUDAN OVERVIEW, supra note 14, at 166.
17 SUDAN OVERVIEW, supra note 14, at 166; see also Glenn Kessler, Rice Visits
Darfur Camp, Pressures Sudan, WASH. POST, July 22, 2005, at A19. The World Health
Organization estimated that 70,000 civilians were killed, 1.5 million persons were
internally displaced and 200,000 refugees fled to Chad as a result of these campaigns.
See STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 16, at 1. Estimates of the number of
civilians killed as a result of the campaigns of the Sudanese military and Janjaweed
range as high as 400,000. Glenn Kessler, Rice Defends U.S. Response to Ethnic
Violence in Sudan, WASH. POST, July 21, 2005, at A19. However, the U.S. State Dept.
has estimated the number of dead between 63,000 and 146,000. Id. In any event, the
crisis in Darfur has contributed significantly to the population of internally displaced
persons in Sudan, which number six million people, the largest such population in the
world. SUDAN OVERVIEW, supra note 14, at 167, 169. The U.S. has estimated the
number of displaced persons to be 4.3 million. CIA, supranote 13, at 11.
18 Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-497, § 3(9), (11),
(12), 118 Stat. 4012, 4013-14 (2004).
19 Critics specifically noted that divestment was unlikely to change the behavior of
the Sudanese government. See, e.g., Jim Doyle, Athletes, Students, Leaders Unite to
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that the Illinois Act and similar initiatives posed serious
consequences for U.S. financial markets and state pension funds.
Such initiatives improperly politicized financial markets,
encouraged companies singled out for divestment to seek out other
sources of capital, and invited retaliation in the form of
prohibitions upon the listing of U.S. companies on foreign
exchanges and pension fund investment by foreign citizens.20
Divestment also required massive stock sales, which would result
in increased risk and volatility as well as loss of value for
investors. 21 These sales would in turn result in significant
Help Sudanese Refugees, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 5, 2006, at A13 quoting Bill Reinsch, the
president of the National Foreign Trade Council, who characterizes divestment
initiatives as "chicken soup diplomacy" which make proponents feel better but do not
succeed in their goal of moderating the behavior of the Sudanese government; Letter
from William A. Reinsch to Albio Sires, supra note 1, at 8. Divestment initiatives such
as the Illinois Act interfered with the balancing of policies formulated by the U.S.
government to achieve national foreign policy goals and placed responsibility for foreign
policy in the hands of state pension managers, who were not trained or empowered to
make national security decisions. See, e.g., Sleeping with the Enemy (So to Speak), THE
COUNCILOR (Council of Institutional Investors, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2004, at 2,
available at http://www.ipers.org/pdfs/news/sleepenemy.pdf [hereinafter Sleeping with
the Enemy]; Letter from Ed Hennessee, President, Nat'l Ass'n of State Ret. Adm's, to
Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., President, Ctr. for Sec. Policy at 2 (Aug. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.divestterror.org/PDF/Joint Letter.pdf. Foreign policy critics also noted the
absence of methods available to investors to determine if companies publicly traded in
the United States are doing business directly or indirectly in Sudan. See, e.g., Sleeping
with the Enemy, supra note 19, at 1-2. Finally, divestment punishes companies who are
operating legally within Sudan and automatically and improperly links such operations
with support for genocide and human rights violations. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, DRAFT NOTE ON INVESTMENT ISSUES-SUDANITERRORISM 3
(2005), available at http://www.cii.org/sitejfilespdfs/learningdraft-notesudan.pdf;
Letter from Ed Hennessee to Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., supra note 19, at I ("[m]erely
highlighting whether a company or its subsidiary has a business tie to a country on the
State Department's terrorism list ... does not disclose whether the company is in some
way 'aiding and abetting our enemies"'); Sleeping with the Enemy, supra note 19, at 1-2
(stating that it would "almost certainly be unwise to conclude that a company that
discloses a business tie to a ... country [on the list of states supporting terrorism] was
supporting terrorism).
20 See, e.g., Letter from William A. Reinsch to Albio Sires, supra note 1, at 8.
21 See Borrus, supra note 12, at 72 (estimating that Illinois pension and retirement
funds would have to divest themselves of investments valued at $368 million, which is
3.3% of the value of its total assets); see also Gilbert Chan, Pension Funds Under
Pressure to Avoid Sudan-Related Investments, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sacramento, Ca.),
May 11, 2005, at Dl quoting Frederick Nesbitt, executive director of the National
Conference on Public Employee Retirement Systems, as stating "funds simply can't
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
transaction Costs. 22 In addition to these losses and costs, state
pension funds would be required to engage in continual and
expensive monitoring in order to identify companies investing in
Sudan and to ensure that existing investments did not commence
operations there. 3
This article examines the Illinois Divestment Act and its
consistency with the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution. First, it examines current developments in Sudan
with particular emphasis on the situation in Darfur, the resulting
humanitarian crisis, and the international response. It then
examines the provisions of the Illinois Act. Finally, the article
analyzes the consistency of the Illinois Divestment Act with the
Commerce Clause. The article concludes that the Illinois
Divestment Act is an unconstitutional intrusion upon the federal
government's authority to regulate commerce.
I. The Conflict in Darfur
Sudanese history has been marked by almost continual conflict
since its independence from the United Kingdom and Egypt in
1956. This history of conflict includes the region of Sudan known
as Darfur. Non-Arab and African ethnic groups, known as zurga,
are primarily agriculturalists inhabiting central Darfur.24 Darfur's
pastoralists are primarily of Arab descent and inhabit the state's
desert north and drought-prone south.25 These groups came into
conflict in the mid-1980s as a result of severe drought and
dump volumes of stock onto the market without risking the loss of millions".
22 BARCLAYS GLOBAL INVESTORS, ANALYSIS OF IRRC-CSAG
TERROR/PROLIFERATION SCREEN: BENCHMARK RISK AND INVESTMENT IMPLICATIONS 1
(2004).
23 Sleeping with the Enemy, supra note 19, at 2.
24 DARFUR IN FLAMES, supra note 15, at 6. The largest ethnic group among the
zurga is the Fur. Id. at 6 n.2. The term "dar" refers to a homeland or territory. Id. As
such, Darfur is the dar of the Fur people. Id. Other ethnic groups within the zurga are
the Bergid, the Berti, the Masalit, the Tama, and the Tunjur peoples. /d.at 6.
25 Id. Northern Darfur is inhabited primarily by nomadic and semi-nomadic camel
herding tribes, including the Arab Beni Hussein, Irayqat, Mahariya, Northern Rizeigat,
and the African Zaghawa. Id. Cattle herding Arab tribes such as the Beni Halba,
Habbaniya, and the Southern Rizeigat inhabit the southern and eastern areas of Darfur.
Id. Regardless of ethnicity, almost all Darfurians are members of the Tijaniya sect of
Sufi Islam. DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 13, at 28.
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increasing desertification in northern Darfur, which caused
increased southward migration of Arab pastoralists. 26 Tribal
leaders most often negotiated resolutions of resulting clashes
between these groups.27 However, political issues proved more
intractable. In 1986, Arab tribes formed the Tujammo al Arabi
(Arab Alliance) to counteract a perceived lack of representation in
local government. 28 These efforts were countered by similar
organizations among the zurga to counteract the national
government's favoritism of Arab groups. 29 Hostilities broke out
again in the late 1990s after Arab groups began to migrate to
central Darfur earlier than usual .30 The combination of ethnic
tensions, extended drought, and the resulting competition for
scarce resources, political disagreement, and ready availability of
firearms rendered these clashes increasingly bloody and beyond
the control of local tribal leaders.3'
Civil war erupted in February 2003 with attacks upon
government property and troops, including the capture of the
Darfurian town of Gulu, by members of the SLA.32 These attacks
were followed by other successful attacks on the Sudanese
People's Armed Forces (SPAF) throughout North Darfur.3 3 JEM
emerged later in 2003 and joined in these attacks.34 The Sudanese
government responded through reprisals as well as recruitment and
utilization of the Janjaweed. Consisting primarily of nomadic
groups living in Darfur and neighboring Chad, the Janjaweed are
led by emirs from local Arab tribes.35 The Sudanese government
26 DARFUR IN FLAMES, supra note 15, at 7.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 13, at 6.
31 Id.
32 DARFUR IN FLAMES, supra note 15, at 9. Originally named the Darfur Liberation
Front, the SLA demanded the creation of a socio-economic initiative for the region, the
disarmament of tribal militias and negotiation of a power-sharing agreement with the
national government. Id.
33 Id. For example, in April 2003, SLA forces destroyed government aircraft and
looted fuel and arms depots in El Fashir, the capital of North Darfur, and Mellit, the
second largest town in North Darfur. Id.
34 Id. at 11.
35 DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 13, at 45. Human Rights Watch has identified
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clothes, feeds, arms, and provides satellite telephones to
approximately 20,000 Janjaweed.36 Janjaweed officers and militia
members also receive salaries from the Sudanese government as
well as assurances of immunity from local prosecution for any
crimes committed while operating in Darfur.37
Numerous serious human rights violations have been
committed by all parties to the Darfur conflict. The primary target
of these violations has been civilian populations. Darfurians have
suffered numerous and significant violations of their personal
integrity and well-being. The World Health Organization
estimates that 70,000 civilians have died as a result of the conflict
in Darfur.38 Civilians, government officials, and humanitarian aid
workers have been subjected to abduction by the SPAF as well as
rebel forces.39 Civilians suspected of supporting the SLA or JEM
have been arrested, detained for prolonged periods of time and, in
some cases, tried, convicted, and sentenced to death by special
courts operating in secrecy. 4° Such persons were likely subjected
to torture and beatings by the SPAF and other government security
forces .4' There has been a "clear and documented pattern of
the leaders of the Janjaweed as emirs from the Awlad Zeid, Beni Halba, Ma'alia, and
Misseriya tribes. Id.
36 Id. at 46. The uniforms of the SPAF and the Janjaweed are identical except for a
badge depicting an armed horseman on the breast of Janjaweed uniforms. Id. Given this
similarity, the only method to distinguish forces is that the Janjaweed usually attack on
horses or camels. Hum. Rts. Watch, Q & A: Crisis in Darfur (2004),
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/05/darfur8536_txt.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2007);
see also DARFUR IN FLAMES, supra note 15, at 22-26 (describing the relationship between
the SPAF and the Janjaweed).
37 DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 13, at 46, 49. According to Human Rights
Watch, Janjaweed officers receive £600,000 Sudanese (U.S. $233) per month. Id. at 46.
Men with horses and camels receive £300,000 Sudanese (U.S. $117) per month while
men without horses or camels receive monthly salaries of £200,000 (U.S. $79). Id.
38 See STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 16, at 1.
39 Id. at 3 (describing the abduction of government officials and humanitarian aid
workers in Darfur); see also DARFUR IN FLAMES, supra note 15, at 22-26 (describing
abductions of children in Darfur).
40 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 16, at 5. Defendants in such cases are
not permitted access to legal representation and are granted only one week to appeal
decisions prior to the carrying out of their sentence. Id. at 6.
41 Id. at 4. Torture is not limited to the SPAF and its allies. In 2004, the African
Union's Ceasefire Commission for Darfur reported that the SLA detained Arab civilians
who were later subjected to repeated beatings. Id.
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sexual abuse" by all parties according to the United States
Department of State. 42 Instances of rape were primarily
committed by members of the Janjaweed and the SPAF and
directed at women of all ages in North Darfur.43
Darfurians have also suffered catastrophic interference with
their property rights. The SPAF has utilized aircraft, primarily
Antonov supply planes converted for use in aerial assaults,
helicopter gunships and MiG jet fighters, to destroy hundreds of
villages inhabited by Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa civilians
throughout Darfur; this destruction was usually in preparation for
an immediate ground attack by the Janjaweed. 44 These attacks
have resulted in destruction of villages, food stocks, water sources,
and other resources essential for the survival of civilian
populations, in addition to widespread looting. Villages may
avoid such attacks only through the payment of bribes to the
42 Id. at 4, 8. Louise Arbour, the United Nations' High Commissioner for Human
Rights, characterized rape, including gang rape, by members of the SPAF as ongoing in
July 2005. See Colum Lynch, U.N. Report Details Rampant Sexual Violence in Darfur,
WASH. POST, July 30, 2005, at A20. According to Commissioner Arbour, the number of
actual rapes is much higher than those reported due to "fear of reprisal" and the absence
of adequate redress for sexual violence. Id. For example, rape victims "have been
denied access to confidential medical treatment" for the purpose of gathering evidence of
a crime, and Sudanese law enforcement often refuses to register or investigate claims of
sexual abuse. Id. Despite the "establishment of a committee to combat gender crimes
and special criminal court," accountability for and punishment of perpetrators of sexual
violence remains inadequate. Id. Commissioner Arbour noted that "of the 230 cases of
rape monitored by United Nations' human rights observers" in Sudanese courts, only
seven convictions have resulted and none arose from sexual abuse that had occurred in
Darfur. Id.
43 DARFUR IN FLAMES, supra note 15, at 29 (describing sexual abuse and rape
committed by the Janjaweed in areas under the control of the Zaghawa in North Darfur).
Rape is a common occurrence during attacks by the Janjaweed in Fur, Masalit, and
Zaghawa areas of Darfur. In May 2004, Human Rights Watch stated that reported
instances of rape occurred in half of the villages destroyed in these areas by the
Janjaweed. DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 13, at 33.
44 DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 13, at 24; see also STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT,
supra note 16, at 7.
45 DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 13, at 26, 28 (describing the destruction of
villages and theft of cattle, horses, goats, and sheep in West Darfur); see also DARFUR IN
FLAMES, supra note 15, at 31. Human Rights Watch also alleged that the SPAF attacked
mosques and desecrated religious articles throughout Darfur despite the common Islamic
heritage of the Sudanese government and the majority of the inhabitants of Darfur. See
DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 13, at 27-28.
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Janjaweed. 46 As a result, more than one million people,
approximately thirty percent of Darfur's population, "have been
forcibly evicted from their homes" and have been deprived of
most of their personal property.47 The majority of these people
have been unable to return to their villages as a result of ongoing
occupation by the Janjaweed.48
The crisis in Darfur has created an estimated two million
internally displaced persons, including more than 200,000
refugees that have fled to neighboring Chad.49 Between sixty and
seventy-five percent of such persons require sustained
humanitarian assistance, including food, water, sanitation, shelter,
and health services.,o However, humanitarian relief has been
available on a reliable basis to only half of those persons in need.5"
A significant cause of the lack of availability of humanitarian
relief has been the Sudanese government's policy of hindering
access to Darfur by relief agencies through denial of entry visas
and travel permits, and harassment by the SPAF, the Janjaweed,
and other government-backed militia and law enforcement
personnel.52 This pattern of human rights violations led Human
Rights Watch to conclude in May 2004 that the Sudanese
46 DARFUR IN FLAMES, supra note 15, at 22. Human Rights Watch has documented
one instance where a village paid U.S. $7000 to the Janjaweed in order to avoid attack.
Id.
47 Id. at 40.
48 Id. at 34.
49 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 16, at 1; see also The Secretary-
General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, 26, delivered to the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. No. S/2005/57 (Jan. 31, 2005). In 2004, Human Rights Watch
reported increased efforts by the SPAF and the Janjaweed to obstruct displaced civilians
from seeking refuge in Chad. DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 13, at 37; see also
DARFUR IN FLAMES, supra note 15, at 35. These efforts included cross-border raids upon
people residing in Chad. DARFUR IN FLAMES, supra note 15, at 37.
50 The Secretary-General, Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur,
13, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. No. S/2005/378 (June 9, 2005).
51 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, 22,
delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. No. S/2005/68 (Feb. 4, 2005). The
Secretary-General estimated that over half of those persons in need received food,
shelter, and access to medical care, but less than half had access to clean water. Id.; see
also Emily Wax, A Cry for Respect in a Sudan Camp, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2005, at Al
(describing conditions in refugee camps for civilians displaced by the conflict in Darfur).
52 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 16, at 8, 12.
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government was engaged in a "policy of 'ethnic cleansing"' of Fur
and Masalit populations, especially in West Darfur.5 3 The United
Nations has concurred in this conclusion on numerous occasions.54
53 DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 13, at 39. Although lacking a formal definition
under international law, "ethnic cleansing" has been defined by a United Nations'
Commission of Experts as:
a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by
violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or
religious group from certain geographic areas . . . [the] purpose [of which]
appears to be the occupation of territory to the exclusion of the purged group or
groups.
U.N. Sec. Council, Report of the United Nations' Commission of Experts Established
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, § 3(B), delivered to the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. No. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994).
54 See, e.g., Press Release, United Nations, Sudan: Envoy Warns of Ethnic
Cleansing as Security Council Calls for Ceasefire (Apr. 2, 2004), available at
http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewslD= 10307&Cr=-sudan&Crl = (quoting
Jan Egeland, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief
Coordinator, as describing the humanitarian situation in Darfur as ethnic cleansing). The
Sudanese government justified its relationship with the Janajweed as necessary to quash
the rebellion. DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 13, at 43 (quoting Sudanese President
Field Marshall Umar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir that "the horsemen" would act in
coordination with the SPAF to defeat the SLA and JEM). In April 2004, Sudanese
Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail admitted that the government "may have turned
a blind eye toward the militias" but defended their actions as "targeting the rebellion."
Id. Officials subsequently admitted that the government's handling of the crisis was
flawed. See Emily Wax, Sudan's Unbowed, Unbroken Inner Circle, WASH. POST, May
3, 2005, at Al, A14 quoting Sudanese Vice President Ali Uthman Muhammad Taha that
"[n]obody would say we have been perfect in handling Darfur. In war, things happen
that are outside of the normal .... In such a complex situation, there would be gaps and
shortcomings. One wishes that this chapter in Sudan's history had not taken place". The
Sudanese government established the Independent Investigation Committee in May 2004
to investigate reports of human rights violations in Darfur. Released in May 2005, the
Committee's report concluded that, although serious human rights violations were
committed by all parties to the conflict in Darfur, genocide did not occur, the number of
persons killed was exaggerated, and rape was not widespread. See Report of the
Secretary-General on the Sudan, supra note 51, 13 (summarizing the report of the
Independent Investigation Committee on human rights violations in Darfur). These
conclusions were universally rejected, and the Sudanese government was condemned for
failing to investigate or charge Janjaweed leaders for crimes committed against civilians
in Darfur. See, e.g., STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 16, at 2. The United
Nations' Secretary-General concluded that the government's efforts failed to address the
"root causes of impunity" to human rights violations, which required "intervention at
every level of government, extensive legislative review and amendment, and the creation
of effective mechanisms and procedures to monitor the actions of the authorities."
Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur, supra note 50, 20.
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The United States Congress and the Bush Administration have
also concurred in this characterization.55
Diplomatic efforts to end the crisis in Darfur commenced
immediately after the outbreak of violence in 2003. Under the
auspices of the African and European Unions, and the
governments of Chad and the United States, the Sudanese
government, SLA, and JEM signed a "humanitarian ceasefire
agreement" in N'Djamena, Chad on April 8, 2004 (N'Djamena
Agreement).56 In addition to mandating a cessation of hostilities,
the N'Djamena Agreement obligated the African Union to commit
personnel to monitor the ceasefire, establish a commission to
monitor and report on ceasefire violations, and required all parties
to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to civilians.5 Most
importantly, the N'Djamena Agreement obligated the Sudanese
government to "commit itself to neutralize" the Janjaweed.5 8 A
joint communiqu6 between the government of Sudan and the
United Nations' Secretary-General on July 3, 2004 addressed
shortcomings in the N'Djamena Agreement by requiring the
55 The U.S. Congress declared the actions of the Sudanese military and Janjaweed
to be genocide on July 22, 2004. See Darfur Genocide Accountability Act of 2005, H.R.
1424, 109th Cong. § 3(1) (2005). Then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, reached
the same conclusion in testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on September 9, 2004. See Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, supra
note 18, § 3(15). Secretary Powell stated that "[w]hen we reviewed the evidence
compiled by our team, along with other information available to the State Department,
we concluded that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of
Sudan and the [Janjaweed] bear responsibility-and genocide may still be occurring."
Id. President Bush subsequently endorsed this conclusion. Darfur Accountability Act of
2005, S. 495, 109th Cong. § 3(3) (2005); see also Jim VandeHei, In Break with U.N.,
Bush Calls Sudan Killings Genocide, WASH. POST, June 2, 2005, at A19. In an address
to the United Nations General Assembly on September 21, 2004, President Bush stated
"[a]t this hour, the world is witnessing terrible suffering and horrible crimes in the
Darfur region of Sudan, crimes my government has concluded are genocide." Darfur
Accountability Act of 2005, supra § 3(3). President Bush reiterated this conclusion on
June 2, 2005 when he stated that he concurred with former Secretary of State Powell's
conclusion that the situation in Darfur constituted genocide. VandeHei, supra at A19.
56 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur, Apr. 8, 2004,
available at http://www.darfurinformation.com/cf-ceasefireagreement.asp [hereinafter
N'Djamena Agreement]; see also DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 13, at 51-52
(discussing the "humanitarian ceasefire agreement"); SUDAN OVERVIEW, supra note 14,
at 166.
57 N'Djamena Agreement, supra note 56, arts. 1-4, 8.
58 Id. art. 6.
[Vol. XXI
2007] STATE DIVESTMENT LAWS & THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 403
government to disarm the Janjaweed, improve humanitarian
access, and prevent further human rights violations. 9 These
agreements were supplemented by the Abuja Protocol of
November 9, 2004, which required all parties to the conflict to
guarantee free movement and access for humanitarian workers and
protection of civilians. 6°
The N'Djamena Agreement and Abuja Protocol were
predecessors to two further agreements concerning Darfur. The
Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese
Conflict in Darfur (Declaration of Principles), signed on July 5,
2005, set forth a seventeen point plan to achieve a peaceful
solution to the conflict in Darfur by the end of 2005.61 However,
the Declaration of Principles failed to resolve the crisis. As noted
by the U.N. Secretary-General in February 2005, "the Darfur
political process [had] not succeeded so far in bearing the hoped-
59 Joint Communiqu6 between the Gov't of Sudan and the United Nations on the
Occasion of the Visit of the Secretary General to Sudan, at 2-3 (July 3, 2004), available
at http://www.unmis.orgEnglish/documents/JC.pdf.
60 Protocol between the Gov't of the Sudan, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
and the Justice and Equality Movement on the Improvement of the Humanitarian
Situation in Darfur, arts. 1-2, (Nov. 9, 2004), available at http://www.
humanitarianinfo.org/darfur/uploads/protocol/The%20Humanitarian%20Situation%20Pr
otocol.doc [hereinafter Abuja Protocol].
61 Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur,
July 5, 2005, available at http://www.africa-union.org/DARFUR/DOP%205-7-
05%20new.pdf [hereinafter Declaration of Principles]. The seventeen principles are: (1)
respect for diversity; (2) commitment to democracy, political pluralism, the rule of law,
the independence of the judiciary, freedom of the media, accountability and
transparency; (3) citizenship rather than religion, ethnicity or gender as the basis for civil
rights; (4) commitment to a federal system of government; (5) effective representation of
all persons at all levels of government; (6) equitable distribution of national wealth; (7)
power and wealth sharing in accordance with "fair criteria" to be agreed upon by the
parties; (8) compliance with international standards of humanitarian law; (9) the right of
internally displaced persons to return to their villages; (10) rehabilitation and
reconstruction of Darfur; (11) the restoration of peaceful co-existence among all
communities in Darfur; (12) affirmation of tribal land ownership and other historical
rights relating to real property; (13) the creation of security arrangements to ensure the
well-being of all Darfurians; (14) the submission of agreements between the parties to
Darfurians for approval; (15) the participation and assistance of the African Union and
the international community in the implementation of such agreements; (16) the
incorporation of agreements between the parties into Sudan's constitution; and (17) the
good faith negotiation of agreements between the parties. Id. arts. 1-17.
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for fruits." 62 The Secretary-General acknowledged that
achievement of a peaceful resolution to the crisis in Darfur had
been complicated by issues underlying the conflict, including a
lack of confidence as a result of a continual pattern of ceasefire
violations and efforts by all parties to improve their military and
political position pending the outcome of the final stages of a
negotiated settlement. 63 Other causes which contributed to the
uncertainty of success of the peace process included the small size
of the African Union peacekeeping force, its resultant inability to
prevent continuing attacks by the Janjaweed, the absence of clear
lines of separation between the opposing parties, and the eruption
of factional fighting between supporters of the SLA and JEM.
64
The Declaration of Principles was followed by the Darfur
Peace Agreement between the Sudanese government and the SLA,
signed on May 5, 2006.65 Negotiated under the auspices of the
United States and subsequently endorsed by the United Nations,
the Darfur Peace Agreement consisted of five separate initiatives.66
First, the Sudanese government was required to complete a
"verifiable disarmament and demobilization" of the Janjaweed by
mid-October 2006, followed by disarmament and demobilization
62 Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, supra note 51, 35; see also
Colum Lynch, Official Pushes for U.N. Force in Sudan, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2006, at
A16 quoting Jan Pronk, the U.N. special envoy to Sudan, that "[1]ooking back at three
years of killings and cleansing in Darfur, we must admit that our peace strategy so far
has failed".
63 Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, supra note 51, 35. More
recently, the Secretary-General has expressed pessimism with respect to the outcome of
the crisis absent "a major new international effort." Kofi A. Annan, Darfur Descending,
WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2006, at A19.
64 See Daniel Pepper, Darfur Stymies Peacekeepers, Few Resources, Strict Rules of
Engagement Severely Hamper African Union Contingent, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 22, 2005, at
All (describing the deteriorating security situation in Darfur).
65 JEM and other smaller rebel groups refused to endorse the Darfur Peace
Agreement. Glenn Kessler, Sudanese, Rebels Sign Peace Plan for Darfur, WASH. POST,
May 6, 2006, at A14. These groups condemned the Darfur Peace Agreement as failing
to provide adequate compensation for victims of the violence, or a significant role for the
groups in regional government as well as failing to permit rebel groups to participate in
the disarmament of the Janjaweed. See Opheera McDoom, Government and Former
Darfur Rebels Work to Heal Rift, REUTERS, Aug. 5, 2006, available at http://
news.scotsman.com/latest.cfm?id= 1137202006.
66 See S.C. Res. 1679, 1-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1679 (May 16, 2006); see also
Kessler, supra note 65, at Al.
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of rebel forces.67 Second, the Darfur Peace Agreement created
mechanisms by which the people of the region could determine
their status. 68 Third, the international community agreed to
convene a donors' conference with the goal of raising $700
million to implement the Agreement for the first three years.69
Fourth, buffer zones were to be created around refugee camps and
humanitarian assistance corridors. 70 Finally, the Sudanese
government agreed to pay $30 million in compensation to victims
of the conflict.7
Despite the Darfur Peace Agreement, the violence remained
unabated at the time of preparation of this article. Fifty thousand
additional people were displaced in Darfur in the two months after
the signing of the Peace Agreement as a result of intensified
fighting between the SPAF, the Janjaweed, and rebel forces that
refused to endorse the peace process.72 Baba Gana Kingibe, the
commander of the African Union peacekeeping mission,
characterized security in Darfur as "plummeting," and the United
Nations described conditions as going from "real[ly] bad to
catastrophic" as evidenced by the killing of eight humanitarian aid
workers in July 2006. 73 As a result, efforts of groups such as
67 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FACT SHEET 2006/472, DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT (May
8, 2006). Disarmament and demobilization of the Janjaweed was to be certified by the
African Union. Id. Four thousand former combatants were to be integrated into the
SPAF through incorporation into the police forces and through education and training
programs. Id.
68 id. Rebel signatories were awarded the position of Senior Assistant to the
President and Chairperson of the newly created Transitional Darfur Regional Authority,
the fourth highest position in the Sudanese government. Id. A referendum was
scheduled for July 2010 in which Darfurians would determine whether to establish the
province as a unitary region with a single government. Id. Prior to the referendum,
signatory rebel groups would be represented in the Sudanese National Assembly and in
the Darfur State Legislature, Governorship, and Ministries. Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 See Todd Pitman, Little Peace Seen in Darfur After Accord, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Aug. 8, 2006, available at http://www.boston.com/news/worldlafrica/articles/
2006/08/08/littlepeaceseen_indarfur_afteraccordl.
73 See Bradley S. Klapper, U.N.: Darfur is Becoming "Catastrophic," ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Aug. 10, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dynlcontentlarticle/2006/08/l0/AR2006081000420.html.; see also Pitman, supra note
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Oxfam, CARE, the International Rescue Committee, and World
Vision were seriously impeded, and the United Nations' World
Food Program was unable to deliver supplies to more than
400,000 people.74 Efforts to bolster the presence of the African
Union in conjunction with United Nations' peacekeepers also
failed. Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan's call for an African
Union force numbering between 15,000 and 18,000 troops serving
alongside 5,300 United Nations' officers fell on deaf ears as the
Sudanese government continued to refuse United Nations'
personnel access into the region.7 5  Consequently, it presently
appears that the Darfur Peace Agreement will serve to be as
unsuccessful as its predecessors in ending the violence wracking
the province.
American critics have noted the lack of success of
international efforts to resolve the crisis in Darfur as well as the
inadequacy of current policy.7 6 Such critics have proposed a four
point plan to strengthen the American response to the crisis.
77
74 See Pitman, supra note 72.
75 See Edith M. Lederer, U.N. Chief Calls for Strengthened Darfur, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Aug. 2, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/08/01/AR2006080101641 pf.html.
76 See, e.g., Barack Obama & Sam Brownback, Policy Adrift on Darfur, WASH.
POST, Dec. 27, 2005, at A25.
77 Current U.S. policy with respect to Sudan consists of four separate initiatives.
Initially, the U.S. designated Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism in August 1993 as a
result of its offering of sanctuary to numerous terrorist leaders, including Osama bin
Laden, and its support of insurrections and radical organizations in Algeria, Egypt,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Tunisia, and Uganda. BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF
STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: SUDAN (NOv. 2006), available at http://www.
state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm. States determined by the U.S. Secretary of State to have
repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism may be designated as state
sponsors pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and the
Export Administration Act. See Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2371(a) (2000);
Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2780(a-b) (2000); Export Administration Act, 50
U.S.C. App. § 2405(j)(1)(A-B) (2000). When read together, the primary sanctions
resulting from such a designation are restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, a ban on the
sale and exportation of defense-related goods, controls placed upon dual use goods and
restrictions upon financial transactions. See id. States currently listed as sponsors of
terrorism by the U.S. Dep't of State are Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and
Syria. COUNTERTERRORISM OFFICE, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, STATE SPONSORS OF
TERRORISM 1 (2005), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/cl4151.htm. Second,
President Clinton issued Executive Order 13,067 on November 5, 1997. The Executive
Order blocked all property interests of the Sudanese government presently located in the
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U.S., coming within the U.S. in the future, or coming into the possession or control of
U.S. persons, including overseas branches. Exec. Order No. 13,067, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,989
(Nov. 3, 1997). Section 2 of the Executive Order prohibited importation of goods and
services of Sudanese origin, the direct or indirect exportation or re-exportation of any
goods, technology or services from the United States or by a U.S. person to Sudan, and
the performance of all contracts by U.S. persons in support of an industrial, commercial,
public utility, or governmental project in Sudan, including the extension of credit and
loans and transactions relating to the transportation of cargo. Id. § 2(a-g). The
Executive Order was implemented by the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, which
imposed significant criminal and civil penalties upon violators. See Sudanese Sanctions
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 538.101-538.901 (2004). Criminal penalties include up to ten
years' imprisonment and fines up to $500,000 for businesses and $250,000 for
individuals. Id. § 538.701(a)(2). Civil penalties may also be imposed in an amount of
no more than $50,000 per violation. Id. § 538.701(a)(1). The third U.S. policy initiative
was the Sudan Peace Act. Signed by President Bush on October 21, 2002, the Sudan
Peace Act states that the U.S. should use all available means to facilitate a
comprehensive solution to the civil war, including multilateral "economic and diplomatic
tools," "reconciliation mechanisms," "humanitarian assistance," and "cooperation its
among trading partners and within multilateral institutions." Sudan Peace Act, §
2(16)(A-E), 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000). Section 6 of the Act requires numerous reports
from the president and the secretaries of the treasury and state regarding ongoing efforts
to resolve the conflict, U.S. efforts to oppose the extension of loans, credits, and
guarantees by international financial institutions to the Sudanese government, the state of
the Sudanese oil and gas industry and the status of human rights and respect for
humanitarian law in the country. Id. §§ 6(b)(1)(A-D), 6(d), 8 (1-4), 1 l(a-b). The Act
empowers the president to impose sanctions, including instructions to U.S. directors of
international financial institutions to actively oppose the extension of any loan, credit, or
guarantee to the Sudanese government, the downgrading or suspension of diplomatic
relations, consideration of all "necessary and appropriate steps" to deny the Sudanese
government access to oil revenues to purchase military equipment or finance military
operations and introduction of a resolution in the U.N. Security Council imposing an
arms embargo. Id. § 6(b)(2)(A-D). Finally, the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act
became law on December 23, 2004. The Comprehensive Peace Act extends the Sudan
Peace Act to include events in Darfur. Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act, § 4(a), 50
U.S.C. § 1701 (2000). The Comprehensive Peace Act also instructs the president to seek
the imposition of a multilateral sanctions regime through a Security Council resolution in
the event of noncompliance by the Sudanese government with the N'Djamena
Agreement or previous Security Council resolutions on Darfur. Id. § 4(b)(6)(A). These
sanctions include an embargo on the importation of Sudanese oil, a freeze on the assets
of Sudanese government and military officials participating in genocide in Darfur as well
as businesses controlled by the Sudanese government, and restrictions upon the transit of
such officials. Id. § 4(b)(6)(C)(i-ii). These sanctions may also be unilaterally imposed
by the United States. Id. §§ 4(b)(7-8), 6(a-c). The Comprehensive Peace Act also
directs the Secretary of State to prepare reports regarding the sources and status of
financing and construction of infrastructure and pipelines for oil exploitation and the
ability of the government to finance military operations utilizing proceeds derived from
oil exploitation, the relationship between Sudan's arms industry and "major foreign
business enterprises," and the status of human rights and respect for humanitarian law in
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. XXXII
First, critics have called upon the Bush Administration to
transform the African Union monitors into "a sizable, effective
multinational force."78 Second, the Bush Administration has been
urged to increase pressure on SLA and JEM to unify their
negotiating positions as well as on the Sudanese government with
respect to power sharing and equitable allocation of natural
resources in Darfur.79 Third, critics have urged the United States
to place additional pressure on states whose involvement in the
conflict has proven destructive or destabilizing, specifically, Chad,
Eritrea, and Libya.8 ° Finally, the Bush Administration was urged
to support the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act, which the
President ultimately signed into law on October 13, 2006.81
the country. Id. § 8(a-b).
78 See, e.g., Obama & Brownback supra note 76, at A25. Obama and Brownback
contend that this goal may be achieved through increasing the number of monitors,
pressuring the Sudanese government to permit advisers from Western states to embed
with the African Union monitors, providing additional military equipment to such
monitors and urging the monitors to undertake additional efforts to protect civilians. Id.
There are recent indications that a peacekeeping force under the control of the U.N. may
ultimately be deployed in Darfur. See Colum Lynch, U.N. Seeks Plan for Peace Force
in Sudan, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2006, at A14 (describing a request by the Security
Council to the Secretary-General to prepare contingency plans to authorize a
peacekeeping force for deployment in Darfur); see also Michael A. Fletcher, Larger
Darfur Force Needed, Bush, Annan Say, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2006, at A12. In
February 2006, President Bush called for the deployment of 7,000 international troops to
serve under U.N. command to supplement forces provided by the African Union. See
Jim VandeHei & Colum Lynch, Bush Calls for More Muscle in Darfur, WASH. POST,
Feb. 18, 2006, at Al. These forces would receive planning and logistical assistance
from NATO. Id.
79 Obama & Brownback supra note 76, at A25.
80 Id.
81 Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-344, 120 Stat.
1869. The Darfur Peace and Accountability Act initially blocks assets and restricts visas
of any individual determined to be "complicit in, or responsible for, acts of genocide,
war crimes, or crimes against humanity in Darfur, including the family members or any
associates of such individual[s] to whom assets or property ... was transferred on or
after July 1, 2002." Id. §5. These sanctions were extended to Janjaweed "commanders
and coordinators" who "impede the peace process, constitute a threat to stability in
Darfur and the region, commit violations of international humanitarian or human rights
law or other atrocities." Id. The Act instructs the president to support expansion of the
mission of and provide assistance to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS),
including assistance from NATO. Id. § 6. This section also denies entry into U.S. ports
for cargo ships and oil tankers engaged in either trade activities relating to oil activities
or the shipment of goods utilized by the Sudanese military. Id. This denial ends as soon
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II. The Illinois Divestment Act
The Illinois Act was signed by Governor Rod R. Blagojevich
on June 25, 2005 after receiving overwhelming support in both
chambers of the Illinois legislature.82 Entitled the "Act to End
Atrocities and Terrorism in the Sudan," the Illinois Act amended
two existing state statutes. Initially, the Act amended one section
and added a new section to the Deposit of State Moneys Act.83
Section 22.5 of the Deposit of State Moneys Act was amended to
grant discretion to the state treasurer, with the approval of the
governor, to "invest or reinvest any State money in the treasury
which is not needed for current expenditure.., in any [b]onds,
notes, debentures[, or other similar obligations of a foreign
government, other than the Republic of Sudan, that are guaranteed
by the full faith and credit of that government." ' The state
treasurer was also free to invest such monies in short term
obligations of corporations organized pursuant to American law
with assets in excess of $500 million as long as the corporation
was not a "forbidden entity" as defined in Section 22.6 of the
as the Janjaweed is demobilized and demilitarized, humanitarian assistance is permitted
to flow without interruption, and refugees and other internally displaced persons are
permitted to return to their homes. Id. U.S. foreign assistance to countries violating
U.N. Security Council resolutions with respect to Sudan is to be discontinued. Id.
Previously-imposed restrictions and sanctions are continued until such time as Sudan
implements all peace agreements with respect to Darfur and the country as a whole,
disarms, demobilizes, and demilitarizes the Janjaweed and other militias, and adheres to
all applicable resolutions of the U.N. Security Council. Id. § 7. The president is
instructed to report periodically to the U.S. Congress on AMIS, the status of sanctions
imposed against Sudan, and the nature and effectiveness of military assistance provided
in an effort to quell continuing bloodshed in the region. Id. § 9. Perhaps most
importantly, the Act as amended by the U.S. Senate and agreed to by the House of
Representatives, omitted Section Eleven, which provided that "[n]othing in this Act (or
any amendment made by this Act) or any other provision of law shall be construed to
preempt any State law that prohibits investment of State funds, including State pension
funds, in or relating to the Republic of Sudan." Darfur Peace and Accountability Act,
H.R. 3127, 109th Cong. § 11 (2005).
82 The Act passed the Ill. Senate unanimously and received 89 of the 118 available
votes in the Ill. House of Representatives. See S.B. 23, 94th General Assembly, House
Roll Call (Ill. 2005), available at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/votehistory/
94/house/09400SB0023_05172005_023000T.pdf; see also Borrus, supra note 12, at 72.
83 See 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/0.01-23 (2006).
84 520/22.5(2.5).
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Deposit of State Moneys Act.85
"Forbidden entities" are defined in a new section of the
Deposit of State Moneys Act as consisting of one of five entities,
including the Republic of Sudan, its agencies, political units, and
subdivisions.86 Companies that are "wholly or partially managed
or controlled" by the Sudanese government or any of its agencies,
political units, or subdivisions are also included in this definition. 7
In addition, all companies established or organized pursuant to
Sudanese law or which have their principal place of business in
Sudan are also "forbidden entities., 88 Two categories of private
enterprises are also considered "forbidden entities." The first
category is any company identified by the Office of Foreign
Assets Control in the United States Treasury Department as
"sponsoring terrorist activities or [having been] fined penalized or
sanctioned by the Office of Foreign Assets Control... for any
violation of any United States rules and restrictions relating to the
Republic of Sudan ... [after] the effective date of this Act., 89
Most broadly, "forbidden entities" include any company
failing to certify under oath to the absence of connections with
Sudan or any company domiciled in Sudan. 90 These
impermissible connections include the ownership or control of
property or assets, the existence of employees or facilities, the
provision or obtaining of goods or services, the existence of
distribution agreements, the issuance of credits or loans, the
purchase of bonds or commercial paper, or any investment in
Sudan or any company domiciled therein. 9 Companies, other than
agencies of the government of Sudan, which are certified as non-
85 520/22.5(7)(iv).
86 520/22.6(b)(1).
87 520/22.6(b)(2). The term "company" is defined to include "any entity capable of
affecting commerce, including but not limited to (i) a government, government agency,
natural person, legal person, sole proprietorship, partnership, firm, corporation,
subsidiary, affiliate, franchisor, franchisee, joint venture, trade association, financial
institution, utility, public franchise, provider of financial services, trust or enterprise and;
(ii) any association thereof." 520/22.6(b).
88 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/22.6(b)(3) (2006).
89 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/22.6(b)(4) (2006).
90 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/22.6(b)(5) (i-ii) (2006).
91 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/22.6(b)(5) (i-ii) (2006).
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governmental organizations by the United Nations or engaged
solely in humanitarian assistance, the promotion of "welfare,
health, religious[,] and spiritual activities and education for
humanitarian purposes[,]" or "journalistic activities" are excluded
from this definition. 92 The Illinois state treasurer is prohibited
from depositing funds or contracting with any financial institution
unless it annually certifies that it has implemented "policies and
practices that require loan applicants to certify that they are not
forbidden entities." 93 The absence of such certification or any
transaction between a financial institution and a company in
violation of the Act is "void or voidable at the joint discretion of
the Treasurer and the financial institution." 94
The Act also added a new section to the Illinois Pension
Code.95 Section 110.5 prohibits fiduciaries of retirement systems
or pension funds established pursuant to state law from
"transferding] or disburs[ing] funds to, deposit[ing] into,
acquir[ing] any bonds or commercial paper from, or otherwise
loan[ing] to or invest[ing] in any entity" unless the company
charged with managing the assets of the retirement system or
pension fund provides an appropriate certification. 96 This
certification, to be prepared at no additional cost to the fiduciary
and in a form established by the state treasurer, must state that the
fund managing company has not "loaned to, invested in[,] or
otherwise transferred any of the retirement system or pension
fund's assets to a forbidden entity any time after the effective date
of this Act." 9' The definition of "forbidden entities" and
exemptions thereto is identical to those set forth in the Deposit of
State Moneys Act with two important additions. 98 Initially,
92 520/22.6(b). The Act also exempts "linked deposits" made in return for an
institution's commitment to "provide, through loans or other financial support, agreed
benefits in projects undertaken in the community and the purchase of depository,
custodial, processing and advisory services that are necessary to fulfill the Treasurer's
obligations and responsibilities." 520/22.6(d).
93 520/22.6(a).
94 520/22.6(c).
95 See 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-101-20 (2006).
96 5/1-110.5(a).
97 5/1-110.5(a)(1). The Act became effective on January, 27, 2006, seven months
after becoming law. 5/1.110.5(c).
98 5/1-110.5(b)(1-6).
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forbidden entities include publicly traded companies who have
been identified by "an independent researching firm that
specializes in global security risk" as having certain enumerated
contacts with Sudan or any company domiciled in Sudan.99 These
contacts include: (1) ownership or control of property or assets in
Sudan; (2) the presence of employees or facilities located in
Sudan; (3) the provision or obtaining of goods or services to or
from Sudan; (4) the existence of distribution agreements; (5) the
issuance of credits or loans; or (6) the purchase of bonds or
commercial paper or the existence of any other type of
investment. 00 The second addition to the Act is the inclusion of
language encompassing non publicly-traded companies. These
companies are required to submit a sworn affidavit to the fund
managing company by an authorized officer that they do not own
or control property or assets or transact "commercial business" in
Sudan.' °'
The document to be provided by fund management must
contain additional certifications. The fund manager must certify
that the fund has not "loaned to, invested in, or... transferred"
assets to any "forbidden entity" after the effective date of the
Act. 10 2 Sixty percent of the assets of the fund must be divested
from "forbidden entities" by twelve months from the effective date
of the Act with divestiture complete within eighteen months after
the effective date.'° 3 The effect of these provisions is to require a
gradual divestment of state retirement systems and pension funds
from investment in companies maintaining defined commercial
contacts with Sudan, to be completed by December 25, 2006."°
99 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.5(b)(5)(i-ii) (2006). The definition of the term
"company" in the Illinois Pension Code is identical to the definition set forth in the
Deposit of State Moneys Act. 5/1.110.5(b).
100 5/1-110.5(b)(5)(i-ii).
101 5/1-110.5(b)(6). The term "commercial business" is undefined by the Act but
presumably encompasses all activities carried on for profit in Sudan.
102 5/1-110.5(a)(1).
103 5/1-110.5(a)(2-3).
104 According to the Genocide Intervention Fund, there are six state and local
pension funds or retirement systems in Illinois maintaining investments in companies
doing business in Sudan. See GENOCIDE INTERVENTION FUND, supra note 11, at 1-2.
These funds are the Illinois State Teachers' Retirement System (thirty-two companies
totaling $727.2 million), the Public School Teachers' Pension and Retirement Fund of
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Two additional provisions of the amended Pension Code are
worthy of mention. In a manner similar to the Deposit of State
Moneys Act, the Pension Code provides that any transaction in
violation of the Act is "void or voidable, at the sole discretion of
the fiduciary."1 °5 Furthermore, the amendments to the Deposit of
State Moneys Act and the Pension Code are to remain in full force
and effect until repeal by the Illinois legislature or the President's
rescission of Executive Order 13,067.106
III. The Illinois Divestment Act and the Commerce Clause
A. Federal Authority over Commerce
In the majority opinion in Gonzales v. Raich, United States
Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens provided a modem
perspective on the United States Constitution's Commerce Clause
Chicago (nineteen companies totaling $476.5 million), the Illinois State Board of
Investment (twenty-seven companies totaling $368 million); the State Universities'
Retirement System (thirty-one companies totaling $320.1 million), the Illinois Municipal
Retirement Fund (eleven companies totaling $97.2 million), and the Chicago
Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund (seven companies totaling $53.5 million). Id.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, there are 371 state and local government
employee retirement systems in Illinois. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, at tbl. 5 (2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/govs/retire/ret03t5.html. The Genocide Intervention Fund thus
surveyed only 1.6% of the state and local government employee retirement systems in
Illinois. These systems maintain cash and investment holdings in excess of $92.8 billion.
Id. at tbl. 4, available at http://www.census.gov/govs/retire/ret03t4.html (concluding that
state government employee retirement systems have cash and investment holdings of
$54.5 billion as compared to $38.3 billion for local government employee retirement
systems). Id. Assuming the accuracy of the Genocide Intervention Fund's $2 billion
estimate for investments in companies doing business in Sudan by state and local
government employee retirement systems and pension funds in Illinois, investments
banned under the Act constitute 2.2% of the total cash and investment holdings of such
systems and funds. This percentage increases to 2.8% if consideration of the holdings of
state and local government employee retirement systems is limited to their investments
in the private sector and 3.4% if consideration of the holdings is limited to investments in
bonds, stocks, and international securities. See id. (finding that state and local
government employee retirement systems in Illinois maintain private investments
totaling $73.5 billion, including stock ($34.5 billion), bonds ($17 billion), international
securities ($8.2 billion), trust funds ($8.2 billion), mortgages ($147.6 million), and other
private investments ($5.5 billion)).
105 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.5(c) (2006).
106 5/1-110.5(c). For a discussion of Executive Order 13,067, see supra note 77 and
accompanying text in footnote.
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jurisprudence. 107 Justice Stevens characterized the Commerce
Clause as "the Framers' response to the central problem giving
rise to the Constitution itself[-]the absence of any federal
commerce power under the Articles of Confederation."' 08 From
the time of the ratification of the Constitution through the late
nineteenth century, the Commerce Clause primarily served to
preclude state legislation which was discriminatory towards other
states. 109 In 1937, the Supreme Court reconsidered the reach of the
Commerce Clause in response to the expansion of federal
authority as memorialized in the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887
and the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890.10 This so-called "new
era" of Commerce Clause jurisprudence recognized three general
categories of commercial activities subject to congressional
regulation: the channels of interstate commerce, the
instrumentalities of persons and things in interstate commerce, and
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce."1
The Interstate Commerce Clause empowers Congress "to
regulate Commerce ... among the several States."" 2 The Clause
has been characterized as "both an affirmative grant of legislative
power to Congress and an implied limitation on the power of state
and local governments to enact laws affecting ... commerce.""' 3
The aspect of the Commerce Clause which acts as an implied
limitation upon the power of state and local governments to affect
commerce is the so-called "dormant" or "negative" Commerce
Clause." 4 Analysis of the dormant Commerce Clause shows that
it permits state laws that evenhandedly effectuate legitimate local
interests in a circumscribed manner with only incidental impact
107 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that the criminalization of the cultivation,
distribution, or possession of marijuana pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act and
its application to intrastate users and growers of marijuana for medical purposes pursuant
to the California Compassionate Use Act did not violate the Commerce Clause).
108 Id. at 16.
109 Id.
110 Id.
I' Id. at 16-17 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37
(1937)).
112 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
113 Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 749 (Md. 1989).
114 See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (1 How.) 299, 320 (1852).
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upon interstate commerce. l5 This analysis attempts to
accommodate local needs with the federal necessity of ensuring
the free flow of national commerce.
In determining the constitutionality of state laws affecting
interstate commerce, the Supreme Court has distinguished
"between state statutes that burden interstate transactions only
incidentally, and those that affirmatively discriminate against such
transactions." 116 Affirmative discrimination against interstate
commerce renders a state statute virtually invalid per se." 7 In
order to sustain such a statute, the state must demonstrate that the
law serves a legitimate local purpose that could not be served
equally as well by any available nondiscriminatory means." 8 Both
the purported legitimate local purpose and the absence of
nondiscriminatory alternatives are subject to strict scrutiny." 9 By
contrast, state statutes that regulate even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest with only incidental effect upon
interstate commerce will be sustained "unless the burden imposed
on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits."' 2 ° Recent Supreme Court opinions have
strongly suggested that such laws are legitimate exercises of state
sovereignty. 2 '
The Commerce Clause also contains a provision that
empowers Congress "to regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations." '22 The Clause recognizes that "[f]oreign commerce is
115 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
116 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986); see also Air Transp. Ass'n of
America v. City & County of San Francisco, 992 F. Supp. 1149, 1164 (N.D. Cal. 1998);
Board of Trustees, 562 A.2d at 754.
117 See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005) ("state laws violate the
Commerce Clause if they mandate 'differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state
economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter'); C & A Carbone,
Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994); Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't
of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994); Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 332,
334 (1992); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
118 See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
119 See id. at 337.
120 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
121 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999).
122 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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preeminently a matter of federal concern."' 123 In case law dating
back 179 years, the Supreme Court has voided state regulations
that discriminate against or obstruct the free flow of foreign
commerce or impede the ability of the federal government to
"speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with
foreign governments."' 124 These considerations are applicable even
in the absence of federal legislation, thereby lending the Foreign
Commerce Clause a dormant aspect similar to that of the Interstate
Commerce Clause. 1
25
Despite this similarity, the scope of federal power with respect
to foreign commerce is broader than that of interstate commerce.
1 26
As such, judicial scrutiny of state regulations which intrude upon
foreign commerce is more rigorous and searching than when states
burden interstate commerce. 127 A state law may survive
constitutional scrutiny only if it "merely has foreign resonances,
but does not implicate foreign affairs."' 128 By contrast, a state law
that "either implicates foreign policy issues which must be left to
the Federal Government or violates a clear federal directive" will
not survive scrutiny. 129 State laws that interfere with the ability of
the federal government to "speak with one voice" in matters
affecting relations with foreign governments will also be
invalidated. 3 ° This rigorous scrutiny serves a similar purpose to
that of the limitation upon the ability of states with respect to
foreign affairs, specifically, to "prevent individual states from
adversely affecting relations with foreign countries that are
properly coordinated on a national level."' 13 1
Applying these general principles to the Illinois Act leads to
123 Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979).
124 See, e.g., Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 419, 448 (1827); Japan Line,
441 U.S. at 449; Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976).
125 See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 454-55.
126 See id. at 448.
127 See Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 n.9 (1980); see also Japan Line, 441
U.S. at 446.
128 Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983).
129 Id.
130 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 449 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S.
276, 285 (1976)).
131 Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 752 (Md. 1989).
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three separate conclusions. First, the Illinois Act lacks a valid
underlying purpose. Even assuming the purpose of the Act is
valid, there is no nexus between the Act and its stated purpose.
Second, the effect of the Act is to expand state power into an area
of exclusive federal concern, thereby interfering with American
foreign policy. The Act also places an impermissible burden on
commerce, is discriminatory, lacks the likelihood of success, and
is not the least restrictive alternative available to Illinois. Finally,
previously-issued legal opinions on the subject matter of state
divestment initiatives, including application of the market
participation doctrine, are outdated, and thus unable to serve as a
constitutional basis for the Act. These conclusions are addressed
separately below.
B. The Purpose of the Illinois Act
It may be contended that the Illinois Act serves an important
state interest in the investment of funds in government-sponsored
retirement plans and pension funds. 132 Such an interest is
undoubtedly a vital and mandatory function that goes to the core
of state sovereignty. The power to determine with whom an
individual state may deal is reserved to the states by the Tenth
Amendment.'33 The Illinois Act merely provides a rational basis
upon which the state could rely in making those determinations. If
all state investment activities having some impact upon commerce
were subject to invalidation, the result would be constant judicial
scrutiny of such activities or de facto federal annexation of state
and local retirement systems and pension funds.
Furthermore, it may be argued that moral interests as
established by the Illinois Act were legitimate criteria for state
investment decisions. 114 State governments are empowered to
132 See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 420 (2003) considering "the
strength of the state interest, judged by standards of traditional practice, when deciding
how serious a conflict must be shown before declaring the state law preempted".
133 U.S. CONST., amend. X (providing that "powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.")
134 See, e.g., Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations,
83 AM. J. INT'L L. 821, 822 (1989); Wendy L. Wallace, Note, Are States Denied a
Voice?: Citizen-Driven Foreign Policy After Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,
52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 793, 808 (2002). But see Howard N. Fenton III, The Fallacy of
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advance the moral interests of their citizens as "guardian[s] and
trustee[s] of [their] people."'35 This is especially true in the field
of state and local retirement systems and pension funds where the
state has been entrusted with the responsible investment of monies
on behalf of its employees. 136 Nevertheless, assuming the
management of retirement systems and pension plans is an
essential state function that lies within the purview of the Tenth
Amendment, such function still must be conducted in a manner
that does not transgress constitutional limitations.
Illinois' purported interests must be disregarded for several
reasons. Initially, the subject matter of the Act is outside the
widely recognized areas of traditional state competence and
concern. The United States Supreme Court has recognized a
number of disparate topics and fields of law as traditional areas of
state concern. These topics include labor, business regulation,
consumer protection, real property, natural resources, domestic
relations, and insurance. 37 The Illinois Act does not implicate any
Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions, 13
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 563, 574 (1993) (condemning moral justifications as "post hoc
rationalizations" designed to influence the attitudes of the parties with whom the state
transacts business and, through them, to influence the domestic policies of foreign
states).
135 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 483 (1980).
136 See, e.g., Board of Trustees, 562 A.2d at 755 (upholding a local ordinance
requiring the divestiture of municipal pension funds in companies transacting business in
South Africa, in part, upon the basis that the municipal government had a duty to ensure
that its funds were not invested in a manner that was morally offensive to many of its
residents and fund beneficiaries); see also Constitutionality of South African Divestment
Statutes Enacted by State and Local Governments, 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 49, 51 n.6
(1986) [hereinafter OLC Opinion] concluding that state and local divestment legislation
survives Commerce Clause scrutiny because, "[s]ince their inception, states have
legislated to reflect the moral sentiments of their communities, and we find nothing in
logic or case law to suggest that the representation of community sentiments may not be
a legitimate basis for state investment.., decisions". According to the Office of Legal
Counsel, the strength of the state's interest as guardian and trustee of its citizens is not
lessened by the fact that the legislation may impact foreign, as opposed to interstate,
commerce. Id. at 54.
137 See, e.g., California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr.,
N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 330, 334 (1997) (prevailing-wage laws); Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 294 (1997) (regulation of local gas franchises); New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers' Ins. Corp., 514 U.S. 645,
649-50, 655 (1995) (regulation of hospital billing); BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511
U.S. 531, 544 (1994) (real property); Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n,
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such traditional interests. Rather, the Act trumpets moral concerns
as its primary motivation. The Court has never once suggested
that moral concerns regarding human rights conditions abroad are
an area of traditional state concern.1 38 As such, "[r]ecognition of a
state's 'moral' interest in severing economic ties with [Sudanese-
related businesses] as a 'legitimate' justification for impeding...
commerce would be unprecedented."''
39
Second, the Act has an insufficient connection with the state of
Illinois to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Despite its purported
concern with the maintenance of integrity of state investments, the
Illinois Act is directed at the activities of multinational
corporations and their subsidiaries residing in Sudan. These
activities are outside of the Illinois marketplace and have little, if
any, impact within the state. Not only are these activities outside
of Illinois' jurisdiction, but so are some of the parties engaging in
these activities, specifically, those corporations whose sole contact
with Illinois is the investment of state pension and retirement
funds in their securities. Furthermore, the human rights violations
that motivated adoption of the Act have no connection with
Illinois. Although it may be sympathetic to the plight of the
489 U.S. 493, 510-12, 514 (1989) (natural resources); Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 626,
628 (1987) (domestic relations); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,
742-44 (1985) (insurance); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)
(weights and measures on product packaging).
138 See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 70-71 (1st Cir. 1999).
In Natsios, the First Circuit held that the "Massachusetts Selective Purchasing Act"
violated the federal government's exclusive control over foreign affairs and the Foreign
Commerce Clause and was preempted by economic sanctions imposed by federal law.
Id. at 57-77. Adopted in June 1996, the Massachusetts Selective Purchasing Act
restricted the state's ability to purchase goods or services from persons maintaining
business relations with Burma. Act Regulating State Contracts with Companies Doing
Business with or in Burma (Myanmar), ch. 130, 1996 Mass. Acts 239 (codified at MASS.
GEN. LAWS, ch. 7, § 22H(a) (West Supp. 1998)). A procuring agency could only award a
contract to a person doing business with Burma if the agency certified in writing that its
procurement was essential, and if compliance with the Act would eliminate the only bid
or offer or otherwise result in inadequate competition. § 22H(b). In the case of
competitive bidding procedures, the Act prohibited the agency from awarding a contract
to a person maintaining business relations with Burma unless there was no other bid or
the only bid from a person not doing business with Burma was ten percent greater than
the lowest bid submitted. § 22H(d). Any contract in violation of the Act was deemed
void. § 22L.
139 Peter J. Spiro, Note, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an Intrusion
upon the Federal Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REV. 813,834 (1986).
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unfortunate victims of the ongoing conflict in Darfur, Illinois has
no legitimate interest in the health, safety, and welfare of such
persons sufficient to support the Act and justify its impact on
commerce. 140 Assuming Illinois has a valid interest in protecting
the sanctity of the state's investment processes and such interest is
primary to other considerations, such interest is insufficient to
validate a legislative act that regulates conduct and relates to
persons outside of the state's jurisdiction.14' Appealing though it
may be to local constituencies,. such an interest is also "unlikely to
be sufficient justification for state action deemed offensive to
federal constitutional priorities."'42
The purported local interest underlying the Illinois Act is
further undermined by the intent of the legislation. The very title
of the Illinois Act betrays its intended reach far beyond state
investment policy. The intent of the Act was also memorialized in
previously-referenced statements of its legislative sponsors and
Governor Blagojevich. 143 The Act's intended impact in Sudan is
further apparent in the provision tying the end of the investment
prohibition and divestment requirement to the improvement of
conditions in Sudan as determined by the lifting of the prohibitions
contained in Executive Order 13,067.44 Had the state been truly
motivated by legitimate concerns such as risk and protection of the
investments of state and local employees, the restrictions would
only be lifted upon improvement in the investment environment,
and the Act would have required divestment in companies doing
business in countries presenting similar investment risks to
Sudan. 145 Rather, the primary purpose of the Illinois Act is to
establish an economic boycott of a single identified country for the
purpose of encouraging it to change its policies with respect to its
140 See Bonaparte v. Tax Ct., 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881) ("No state can legislate
except with reference to its own jurisdiction.")
141 See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 63-64.
142 Fenton, supra note 134, at 574.
143 See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
144 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.5(c) (2006).
145 See Fenton, supra note 134, at 575 (contending that if legitimate state concerns
with respect to risk and rate of return were the true motivation for divestment initiatives,
states would reevaluate their investments in companies doing business in Latin America
and Africa or countries engaged in military action or combating an insurgency).
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governance of a single province within its national borders.146 The
stated intent of preserving the sanctity of investment practices is
merely tangential to this primary purpose. 147 This purpose is
outside the scope of legitimate local concern, and Illinois cannot
"use the gloss of legitimate intentions [to the extent preservation
of the sanctity of investment practices is a legitimate state interest]
to mask the shortcomings of illegitimate ones."'
148
Legislative sponsors of the Act cited Illinois as the first state in
the United States to terminate its investments in South Africa in
response to the system of apartheid. 49 At least one recent case
supports the relevancy of the historical context to Commerce
Clause analysis. In Air Transport Association of America v. City
146 See Carol E. Head, Note, The Dormant Foreign Affairs Power: Constitutional
Implications for State and Local Investment Restrictions Impacting Foreign Countries,
42 B.C. L. REv. 123, 161 (2000). Head contends that state and local divestment laws are
implicitly and predominantly motivated by objectionable policies of foreign sovereigns.
Id.
147 See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 428 (2003) (holding that the
primary purpose of the California Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act had only a
"tangential relation to present-day insuring in the State" so as to excuse its intrusion
upon the authority of the federal government with respect to the conduct of foreign
relations). The California Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act required any insurer
doing business in the state to disclose information pertaining to "life, property, liability,
health, annuities, dowry, educational[,] or casualty insurance policies ...[issued] to
persons in Europe" between 1920 and 1945. CAL. INS. CODE § 13804(a) (2006).
"Persons in Europe" were not limited to Holocaust victims but rather covered all persons
in Europe between 1920 and 1945. § 13804(a). The disclosure requirement included
"related companies," which were defined as "any parent, subsidiary, reinsurer, successor
in interest, managing general agent[,] or affiliate company of the insurer" regardless of
whether the companies were related at the time of the sale of the policy. §§ 13802(b),
13804(a). Insurers were required to report the current status of each policy, the city of
origin, domicile or address of each policyholder and the names of the beneficiary. §
13804(a). This information was to be placed in a registry open to the public. § 13803.
Penalties for failure to comply with the disclosure requirement included mandatory
suspension of the insurer's license to do business in California and misdemeanor
criminal sanctions for misrepresentations with respect to the payment of claims and
identity of those receiving such payments. §§ 13804(b), 13806. The Act was intended
to enhance enforcement of California's unfair business practice statute (which defined
unfair business practices to include failure to pay a valid insurance claim of a Holocaust
survivor) and facilitate the filing of civil lawsuits in state courts on insurance claims
arising from acts perpetrated during the Holocaust. § 790.15(a); see also CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 354.5 (2006).
148 Spiro, supra note 139, at 834.
149 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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& County of San Francisco, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California focused on San Francisco's
"long-term interest in not indirectly supporting discriminatory
business practices." 150 The court deemed this interest to be
sufficient to insulate the city's prohibition upon contracting with
firms that did not extend benefits to domestic partners from
invalidity pursuant to the Commerce Clause.151 The court took
particular note of the city's "long history of taking a principled
stand against discrimination and of being in the forefront of efforts
to ban discrimination based on sexual orientation." 152 The
ordinance was thus a permissible expression of the "city's
sensitivity to the deep feeling of its citizens on [a] matter of
fundamental human dignity." 153 The court also noted that a
plurality of the United States Supreme Court recognized that local
governments have a compelling interest in assuring that public
revenues do not "serve to finance the evil of private prejudice." 154
Historical context, however, provides a dubious basis upon
which to sustain the Illinois Act. Although states undoubtedly
have a significant interest in the preservation of their history, this
interest does not rise to the level of permitting derogation from the
Commerce Clause. The potential ramifications for commerce in
the event that every state and locality was permitted to indulge
their historical traditions would be catastrophic. A multiplicity of
conflicting traditions would result in a multiplicity of restrictions,
sanctions and other encumbrances upon commerce. Such
hindrances would overwhelm the effective operation and
enforcement of the Clause itself. The recognition of such an
exception in Commerce Clause litigation may inspire ad 'hoc
rationalizations and fabricated historical traditions in support of
legislation clearly designed to discriminate against foreign
businesses. Furthermore, certain historical traditions, especially
those arising from past interstate rivalries, may prove unworthy of
preservation. The court's opinion in Air Transport can be
150 992 F. Supp. 1149, 1164 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
151 See id. at 1164.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989)
(plurality opinion)).
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classified as a judicial anomaly restricted to the locale and
circumstances at issue therein. As such, it would be inappropriate
to use the opinion in Air Transport as a foundation for the Illinois
Act.
Although the shared interest between the federal and state
policies in exerting pressure upon the Sudanese government to end
its genocidal policies in Darfur is irrelevant in Commerce Clause
analysis, there is actually direct conflict between the Illinois Act
and the federal sanctions regime with respect to Sudan. Assuming
Illinois is acting in a field of traditional competence, its sanction of
all transactions with Sudan, its penalization of United States
subsidiaries operating legally in Sudan as well as foreign
companies, the absence of consultation, and hindrance of the
president's authority and ability to broker international
cooperation on resolution of the crisis in Darfur represent
irreconcilable differences between federal and state interests in
this instance. As such, Illinois' interest must give way to federal
policy. As noted by the United States Supreme Court on two
separate occasions, "the fact of a common end hardly neutralizes
conflicting means." ' Furthermore, the Court has deemed it
"beyond peradventure that federal power over commerce is
'superior to that of the States to provide for the welfare or
necessities of their inhabitants,' however legitimate or dire those
necessities may be."' 56 This is especially true when the state's
motivations are questionable and the selected methods are in
conflict. These issues serve to negate consideration of the shared
interests of the federal government and Illinois. Rather, the
inescapable conclusion is that this is a matter best left to the
federal government.
Finally, the divestment penalty is not the least restrictive
alternative in promoting the state's interests. If the integrity of the
state's investments was truly the Act's primary concern, Illinois
could have considered an approach expressing an intention to
disassociate itself from firms maintaining commercial ties with
Sudan rather than imposing the penalty of absolute
155 Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 425 (2003) (citing Crosby v. Nat'l
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 379 (2000)).
156 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005) (quoting Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v.
United States, 266 U.S. 405, 426 (1925)).
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disqualification. Alternatively, Illinois could have required
extensive disclosures about the ethical conduct of current and
potential investment targets, including the location and nature of
their overseas operations. These disclosures could also have
included compliance with internal codes of conduct or the
requirement that such companies adopt a code of conduct
appropriate to their business operations. Continuous reporting and
disclosure requirements could have ensured the currency and
accuracy of all information in the state's possession. In addition,
Illinois could have adopted its own voluntary code of conduct for
firms seeking state investment monies and publicized the names of
those companies ascribing or refusing to ascribe to its code. A
non-binding resolution condemning companies for their activities
in Sudan was another option for the state. Another alternative
would have been to forego condemnation of particular states but
rather focus on general conditions such as human rights and
environmental protection."' Although the constitutional status of
these alternatives is uncertain, they are undoubtedly less onerous,
and consequently less suspect, than the blanket disqualification
inflexibly imposed by the Act.
C. The Effect of the Illinois Act
The failure of the Act to leave the matter of a response to the
policies of the Sudanese government in Darfur to the federal
government damages American commercial and foreign policy
interests. By conditioning eligibility for continued state
investment on conduct beyond state and national borders, the Act
is an unconstitutional expansion of state jurisdiction upon federal
authority. 158 Specifically, the Act impedes the ability of the
federal government to speak with one voice with respect to Sudan.
157 See Wallace, supra note 134, at 831 (contending that condition-specific
divestment initiatives will survive constitutional scrutiny if combined with an articulated
economic justification, a reasonable time frame for divestment, and minimization of
ongoing state scrutiny of foreign affairs).
158 See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 69-70 (1st Cir. 1999)
(holding the conditioning of eligibility for state contracts on conduct beyond state and
national borders as set forth in the Massachusetts Selective Purchasing Act to be an
unconstitutional expansion of state jurisdiction upon federal authority); see also Wallace,
supra note 134, at 810 (contending that divestment statutes targeting individual countries
have a direct impact on foreign affairs).
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The Illinois Act ignores the nuances of American policy toward
Sudan as represented by Executive Order 13,067, the Sudan Peace
Act, and the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act.5 9 In its place,
Illinois imposes a regulatory scheme that differs substantially from
that of the United States government. The Illinois Act sanctions
all transactions with Sudan rather than the seven separate
transactions identified in Executive Order 13,067.'60 Furthermore,
the Illinois Act sanctions United States subsidiaries that are
operating legally in Sudan as well as foreign companies, both of
which are outside the scope of the prohibitions within the
Executive Order. 161 The inclusion of foreign companies is
particularly problematic as it threatens to undermine the spirit of
international cooperation memorialized in the Sudan Peace and the
Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Acts.
Mandatory divestment also may serve to interfere with the
president's ability to obtain agreement for the imposition of
sanctions by the international community as contemplated by
federal legislation. The Sudan Peace Act instructs the president to
consider all "necessary and appropriate steps" to deny the
Sudanese government access to oil revenues.162 By contrast, the
Illinois Act immediately penalizes companies serving as the
source of such revenues without presidential consideration or
consultation. The president's efforts to seek the imposition of an
international sanctions regime at the United Nations as
contemplated by the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act are also
compromised by the Illinois Act. The Illinois Act may hinder the
president's ability to obtain the cooperation of United Nations'
members whose companies have suffered "blacklisting" and
resultant loss of capital despite the legality of their investments in
Sudan. Furthermore, the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act
contemplates well-defined international sanctions limited to the
159 See supra note 77 and accompanying text; see also Spiro, supra note 139, at 817
(criticizing state divestment initiatives with respect to South Africa as overshadowing
private sector responses to apartheid and transcending federal policy as memorialized in
applicable executive orders and legislation).
160 Compare Exec. Order No. 13,067, supra note 77, § 2 with 15 ILL. COMP. STAT.
520/22.6(b)(1-5) (2006) and 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.5(b)(1-6) (2006).
161 See 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/22.6(b)(5)(i-ii) (2006); 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-
110.5(b)(5-6) (2006).
162 Sudan Peace Act, § 6(b)(2)(C), 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000).
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freezing of assets of the Sudanese government and military
officials and the encouragement of an embargo of Sudanese oil. 163
By contrast, the Illinois Act is a blunt instrument imposing an
across-the-board penalty on any company maintaining a business
relationship in or with Sudan as certified by a state government
official utilizing sources the accuracy of which have not been
subject to verification by the federal goverment.'64 The same
comparison and conclusion applies to the limited United States
sanctions contemplated by the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan
Act. 165 As noted by the United States Supreme Court in its
opinion striking down California's Holocaust Victim Insurance
Relief Act, the state "seeks to use an iron fist where the President
has consistently chosen kid gloves." 166 At the very least, the
president's ability to seek, impose, waive, and lift national and
international sanctions as necessary is shared with a state
government official responsible for the administration of Illinois'
separate sanctions regime. 167
The lack of specificity and required consultations with the
federal government constitute further intrusions upon federal
power and interferences with the ability of the United States to
speak with one voice with respect to Sudan. The Illinois Act
empowers the state treasurer to determine the existence of
business relations between financial institutions, publicly traded
and privately held companies and Sudan, as well as evaluate the
credibility of certifications provided by such entities. 168 Such
inquiries and evaluations are to proceed independently and without
consultation of the federal government. Rather, the process relies
on the initiative and discretion of the state treasurer who may rely
on an unidentified "independent researching firm" to determine
163 Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act, § 4(b)(6)(C)(i-ii), 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000).
164 See 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.5(b)(5)(i-ii) (2006) (providing for certification
of "forbidden entities" by "an independent researching firm that specializes in global
security risk").
165 Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act, §§4(b)(7-8), 6(a-b).
166 Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 427 (2003).
167 See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000)
(condemning state legislation that "compromise[s] the very capacity of the President to
speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other governments").
168 See 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/22.6(a) (2006); 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.5(b)(6)
(2006).
[Vol. XXXII
2007] STATE DIVESTMENT LAWS & THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 427
the existence of prohibited commercial relations. 169 The Act
provides no other guidance to the treasurer with respect to the
determination of prohibited commercial contacts or the evaluation
of the credibility of the required certifications. The Act also
empowers the Illinois legislature to determine whether the policies
of the Sudanese government have changed such as to merit the
lifting of the divestment penalty.17 ° These policy changes are not
defined in the Act. This lack of definition encourages the
legislature to establish its own internal criteria by which to
evaluate events occurring within Sudan without federal input,
oversight, and control.
Finally, the Act increases the threat that foreign states may
retaliate against the United States because of the commercial
policies of one state. 171 Two specific types of retaliation are
possible. Initially, the Sudanese government may react negatively
to Illinois' attempts to interfere in its internal affairs or damage its
economy.'72 This is an even more distinct possibility in the event
Illinois succeeds in encouraging companies to withdraw from
Sudan, thereby depriving its economy of needed financial and
human capital.'73
The second type of potential foreign retaliation is of greater
consequence. This retaliation would originate from foreign states
whose multinational corporations or their subsidiaries were either
driven from Sudan by the Act or suffered financial losses as a
result of its mandatory divestment provisions. Such retaliation is a
possibility given that the investments which Illinois seeks to
penalize may be legal pursuant to the national laws applicable to
these enterprises. Retaliatory measures could include greater
scrutiny of the public filings of American companies required by
169 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/22.6(c) (2006); 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.5(b)(5)(i-
ii) (2006).
170 See 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.5(c) (2006).
171 See Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Fin., 505 U.S. 71, 79
(1992).
172 See Spiro, supra note 139, at 837 ("[D]ivestment measures discriminate against
one particular nation so as to make offense a virtual certainty and retaliation a strong
possibility.")
173 See Wallace, supra note 134, at 810 (noting that divestment laws may have a
direct impact on foreign relations to the extent they force companies to make choices
between investment in the targeted country and the state's continued patronage).
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foreign law and consequent delays and questions about their own
investment activities such as the location of investments and
complicity in human rights violations. The risk of such retaliation
is very real given the controversial involvement of American
corporations in locations such as Iraq and Myanmar. In any event,
no matter how remote the risk of such retaliation, the mere
possibility that foreign state action may offend American trading
partners and result in foreign retaliation is an important aspect of
Commerce Clause analysis.174
Depending upon the form it takes, such retaliation may harm
national commercial interests. In addition, such retaliation may
harm national political interests as well as Illinois' interest in the
peaceful resolution of the conflict in Darfur to the extent there is
interference in international efforts to address the crisis. Under
such circumstances, the Illinois Act would become an unnecessary
distraction from the more important task of ending the continuing
humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur. Nevertheless, Illinois adopted
the Act despite the fact that it possessed, in the words of the
United States Supreme Court in Container Corporation, "little
competence in determining precisely when foreign nations will be
offended by particular acts, and even less competence in deciding
how to balance a particular risk of retaliation." 175 Such
competence has been entrusted by the Constitution to the federal
government, acting on behalf of the country, rather than to its
constituent parts acting in their own perceived self-interest.
The Illinois Act also has a discriminatory effect which violates
the Commerce Clause. The Act discriminates against, or at the
very least negatively impacts, two subsets of foreign commerce:
commerce involving companies organized or operating in Sudan
and commerce involving companies doing business in Sudan.
Illinois has disqualified domestic and foreign companies
maintaining any connection with Sudan from eligibility for any of
the state funds available for investment. The Illinois Act further
discourages domestic and foreign companies from having any
future contact whatsoever with Sudan or any Sudan-based entity.
These companies may decline to enter the Sudanese marketplace
due to the potential that such entry would disqualify them from
174 See Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983).
175 Id.
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future state investment. In addition to harming the Sudanese
economy, the Act may also harm Illinois by encouraging negative
perceptions of its business environment.
Furthermore, the Act's reach may go beyond companies in
which Illinois pension funds and retirement systems maintain
investments to include examination of affiliated companies, such
as subsidiaries, and other companies in the distributive chain.
These companies may operate independently in interstate and
foreign commerce without maintaining any contact whatsoever
with Illinois. Nevertheless, their commercial ties are relevant to
the determination of whether companies in which Illinois pension
funds and retirement systems maintain investments are engaged in
commercial relations with Sudan. Thus, the potential impact of
the Act extends far beyond Illinois' borders and serves to chill the
free flow of commerce across national and international
boundaries.
The Act may be defended on the basis that the Illinois
legislature and governor did not intend to secure economic
advantages for local businesses at the expense of businesses
situated elsewhere. 7 6 This is undoubtedly true as demonstrated in
the previous section discussing the purpose of the Act. However,
the absence of discriminatory intent alone is irrelevant. The
deciding factor remains the discriminatory effect of the Act,
regardless of intent. As demonstrated above, the Illinois Act
discriminates against all companies, foreign or domestic,
maintaining any economic connection with Sudan. 17
Furthermore, the Act favors foreign and domestic companies
absent from Sudan with the reward of state investment funds at the
176 See Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 750 (Md. 1989)
stating that, because the ordinance adopted by the City of Baltimore mandating
divestment in companies doing business in or with the Republic of South Africa lacked
discriminatory intent against nonresidents, it "pose[d] a smaller threat to the national
common market than do... overtly discriminatory measures".
177 See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 68 (1st Cir. 1999)
(holding the Massachusetts Selective Purchasing Act to be discriminatory on the basis
that it punished all businesses having any commercial tie to Burma). The First Circuit
specifically noted that "[w]hen the Constitution speaks of foreign commerce, it is not
referring only to attempts to regulate the conduct of foreign companies; it is also
referring to attempts to restrict the actions of American companies overseas." Id.
(emphasis omitted).
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expense of companies maintaining such contacts, 7 8 despite the
fact that such contacts may be permissible pursuant to the national
laws applicable to such companies. In addition, the potential
burdens placed upon commerce are clearly excessive in light of
the minimal interest of the state in the status of human rights in
Sudan and the conflict in Darfur. "9 The Act places an
impermissible financial barrier around Illinois by requiring all
companies to conform their conduct to its sense of morality or
suffer loss of investment monies. 1
80
The Illinois Act may also be defended on the basis that it is
unlikely to be effective. Specifically, it may be contended that the
Act and related initiatives in other states will have no influence on
the commercial activities of companies with respect to Sudan. As
such, divestment laws "merely... communicate a moral or
philosophical community position."'181 However, as has been aptly
noted with respect to the divestment campaign directed at South
Africa in the 1980s and is equally applicable to Sudan, "it is
illogical to argue that state or local governments would craft such
precise laws without intending any effects, when enacting simple
resolutions of condemnation would communicate the same
message[]. 182 Rather, Illinois, like its predecessors in the anti-
apartheid movement, adopted the Act "on the basis of its
presumed or potential impact on the target firms." 183 The
seriousness of Illinois' intent is demonstrated by the significant
amount of money subject to potential divestment, the probable
negative impact upon the value of state retirement and pension
funds as a result of divestment, and costs associated with such
sales and necessary monitoring.1'8 The provisions and penalties
178 See Wallace, supra note 134, at 828 ("[A] law that discriminates against all
firms, foreign and domestic, with business in [the target country] violates the Foreign
Commerce Clause .... ")
179 See Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 433-
34 (2005); see also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
180 Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 545 U.S. at 433-34; see also Am. Trucking Ass'ns v.
Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 284 (1987).
181 Fenton, supra note 134, at 577.
182 Id. at 578.
183 Id. at 577.
184 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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imposed by the Act are not the product of a state communicating a
moral or philosophical position. Rather, the Act represents a
gamble with the retirement savings and pensions of thousands of
state workers with the potential for significant effect on national
financial markets.
Even assuming the absence of discrimination, the Illinois Act
places an impermissible burden upon commerce. United States
foreign policy regarding permissible and impermissible
commercial contacts with Sudan is clearly set forth in Executive
Order 13,067 and the Sudan Peace and Comprehensive Peace in
Sudan Acts.'85 However, as previously noted, Illinois has selected
a policy significantly different from that adopted by the federal
government or the vast majority of its sister states. 186 This
multiple and conflicting regulation is a burden upon businesses
engaged in foreign commerce. Instead of merely ensuring their
operations conform to the requirements of United States law, such
companies must now also ensure compliance with the more
stringent state standards set forth in the Illinois Act or suffer the
potential loss of investment monies. The net effect of such
multiple policies is a proliferation of the regulation of international
commercial activities, a result clearly sought to be prevented by
the Foreign Commerce Clause. 187 The likelihood of further
burdens upon foreign commerce is significant if the Illinois model
is widely adopted by other states.
The compulsive nature of the Illinois Act and its effect upon
foreign commerce cannot be overlooked. Although companies are
free to do business within Sudan subject only to prohibitions
contained in laws adopted by their national legal systems, such
business comes at a significant cost in lost investment monies
originating from the state of Illinois. The amount of this penalty is
185 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
186 See discussion supra Part III.C.
187 See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005) (condemning differing state
standards with respect to the direct shipment of out-of-state wines as resulting in "a
proliferation of trade zones"); see also Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 420
(2003) (concluding that "a sufficiently clear conflict" existed such as to require
preemption of the California Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act by executive
agreements between the United States and Germany in July 2000 relating to the
settlement of unpaid claims arising from the actions of German companies during World
War II).
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significant with a potential impact of more than $368 million in
required divestment plus indeterminate amounts relating to
associated costs and loss of portfolio value.188 This penalty may
ultimately rise to several billion dollars in the event the Illinois
model is adopted by other states. 8 9 Furthermore, the divestment
penalty may be triggered at any time as the Act attaches
continuing conditions upon the commercial dealings of companies
seeking to remain eligible for state investments. This form of state
economic compulsion has been condemned by the United States
Supreme Court to the extent it differs from economic compulsion
and other regulation imposed at the federal level.' 90 In a manner
similar to the California legislation at issue in American Insurance
Association v. Garamendi, Illinois has elected to employ "a
different state system of economic pressure" which has undercut
federal authority and policies.' 9' As such, the Illinois Act would
likely suffer the same fate as the failed California legislation if
subjected to judicial scrutiny.
D. The Illinois Act and Previous Legal Opinions
1. The Opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel
A different approach to the Commerce Clause was adopted by
the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in its opinion addressing the
constitutionality of state and local divestment initiatives.' 9 Issued
during the height of the anti-apartheid movement, the OLC's
opinion concluded that state statutes that required the divestment
of state or local pension funds from companies doing business in
South Africa were shielded from the strictures of the Commerce
Clause by the market participation doctrine.' 93 According to the
OLC, divestment initiatives aimed at South Africa reflected the
moral sentiments of state and local communities, whose
governments were acting legitimately as the guardians and trustees
188 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
189 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
190 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 423-24.
191 Id. (citing Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 376 (2000)).
192 OLC Opinion, supra note 136, at 51-59.
193 Id. at51.
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of their constituencies. 194 According to the OLC, there was
"nothing in logic or case law to suggest that the representation of
community sentiments may not be a legitimate basis for state
investment or contractual decisions."1 95
Once the legitimacy of the underlying purpose of the
legislation had been established, the OLC concluded that South
African divestment initiatives were exercises of state proprietary
powers rather than regulation. Specifically, the OLC concluded
that, in adopting such initiatives, the state was "exercising the
prerogatives and the powers that any private person or entity
enjoys as a matter of contract and property rights."1 96 The states
possessed these proprietary powers when the Constitution was
adopted and they could not be displaced other than through "a
specific limitation imposed by the Constitution or federal
legislation passed pursuant to a constitutional grant of power to the
federal government."' 19
7
The OLC concluded that the historical evidence did not
sanction limiting upon the ability of states to purchase goods and
services based upon the Commerce Clause, regardless of whether
such purchases indirectly impact foreign or interstate commerce. 198
Rather, the Framers were concerned about state regulatory activity
with respect to such commerce. 99 Under this argument, state
divestment initiatives did not constitute regulation because the
state did not possess monopoly power in the national securities
markets in which they participated. 200 As such, these divestment
initiatives lacked the coercive power associated with regulation
imposed by states in their sovereign capacities. 201 This
characterization also led to the conclusion that such initiatives did
not subject foreign companies to the risk of multiple regulation. °2
194 Id. at 51 n.6.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 53.
197 id. at 64.
198 OLC Opinion, supra note 136, at 53-54.
199 Id. at 54.
200 Id. at 52 n.7.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 55. Unlike the state tax on shipping containers used solely in foreign
commerce that was struck down under the Foreign Commerce Clause in Japan Line, Ltd.
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Furthermore, divestment legislation did not impose continuing
conditions on businesses but only conditions precedent to
eligibility for state investments. 3 In so doing, states were not
unconstitutionally imposing conditions in markets in which they
were not participants. 204 The OLC thus concluded that
"[w]herever the state exercises its power as a buyer or investor to
impose some contractual term on a company with which it deals, it
is acting as [sic] in its proprietary rather than regulatory
capacity. ' 205 The exercise of such proprietary powers was not
subject to the restraints of the Commerce Clause.20 6
The OLC opinion and the potential application of its reasoning
to the Illinois Act necessitate discussion of the market
participation doctrine. The market participation doctrine serves to
shield state procurement activities from Commerce Clause
scrutiny in the absence of federal action and when the state is
acting as a party to a commercial transaction rather than as a
market regulator.0 7 The doctrine dates back to the 1940s. For
example, in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., the United States
Supreme Court equated government purchases to those in the
private sector in holding that "the Government enjoys the
unrestricted power.., to determine those with whom it will deal,
and to fix the terms and conditions upon which it will make
needed purchases. 2 8 In order to assure an orderly and equitable
contracting process, states were empowered to "lay down
guideposts by which its agents are to proceed in the procurement
of supplies, and which create duties to the [state] alone. ' '209
The market participant exception received its fullest
v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 445-46 (1979), divestment initiatives do not
carry with them the risk that foreigners will be subject to multiple regulations or
taxation.
203 Id. at 56 (distinguishing divestment initiatives from the statute considered in
South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 99 (1984), which required
that all timber bought from Alaska be processed in Alaska).
204 OLC Opinion, supra note 136, at 56.
205 Id. at 57.
206 Id. at 55.
207 White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 210 (1983).
208 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940).
209 Id.
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expression in two Supreme Court cases from the 1970s. In
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., the Court upheld a program
that paid a bounty for recycling abandoned cars formerly titled in
Maryland. 210 However, the documentation requirements for
receipt of the bounty were more lenient for Maryland processors
211than for non-Maryland processors. In upholding this difference,
the Court held that the state was not regulating the processing of
abandoned vehicles but "ha[d] entered into the market itself to bid
up their price.2 The Court determined that neither the
Commerce Clause nor its underlying purposes "prohibits a [s]tate,
in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the
market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over
others. 21 3
The Court further elaborated upon the market participant
doctrine four years later in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake.21 4 In Reeves, the
Court upheld South Dakota's policy of restricting sales from a
state-owned cement plant to state residents during a shortage. The
Court specifically held that, when acting as proprietors, states are
free to exercise their independent discretion as to the parties with
whom they will deal without constraint by the Commerce
Clause.215 Federal restraint in the area of state procurement was
mandated by considerations of sovereignty and the role of each
state to act as "guardian and trustee for its people." 2l6
Furthermore, federal restraint was justified by the similarity
between the state's exercise of its proprietary powers and that of
private industry.2 7 The Court noted that private industry had long
enjoyed the right to exercise its discretion as to the parties with
210 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
211 Id. at 800-01.
212 Id. at 806.
213 Id. at 810.
214 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
215 Id. at 439.
216 Id. at 438. (quoting Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 191 (1915)). The Court
noted that a state's participation in the marketplace in the same manner as private
industry is an example of the constitutional exercise of state sovereignty in an area
involving traditional governmental functions. Id. at 438 n.10. The Court thus concluded
that "[s]tates may fairly claim some measure of a sovereign interest in retaining freedom
to decide how, with whom, and for whose benefit to deal." Id.
217 Id. at 439.
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whom it chose to contract.218 Fundamental fairness thus dictated
that this same freedom be granted to states when acting in a
proprietary role.21 9 While acknowledging that there may be limits
to this similarity and hence the doctrine itself, the Court declined
to elaborate upon such boundaries. 220 Rather, the Court reasoned
that Congress was better situated to impose such limitations, since
the issues arising from application of the doctrine were "subtle,
complex, politically charged, and difficult to assess under
traditional Commerce Clause analysis. 22'
Nevertheless, the doctrine is not carte blanche for states to
cloak regulatory activity under the guise of market participation.
States cannot utilize the doctrine for non-proprietary purposes or
in order to exercise influence in markets beyond those in which
they participate. For example, in South-Central Timber
Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, the Supreme Court struck down
an Alaskan statute that required all timber sold from designated
state-owned property to be processed within the state.222 The
Court observed that Alaska was not "merely choosing its own
trading partners," but rather was "attempting to govern the private,
separate economic relationships of its trading partners. ' 223 The
market participant exception did not grant the state the freedom
"to impose any conditions that [it] ha[d] the economic power to
dictate., 2 4 Nor did the exception validate any condition merely
because of the fact that it was imposed upon someone with whom
the state was in contractual privity. 225 The state's proprietary
interest ended with the removal of the timber from state land and
hence could not support the imposition of downstream conditions
such as the processing requirement. 226 Courts must look,
therefore, beyond the state's designation of its activities as
proprietary and examine their actual purpose and effect. The
218 Id. at 438-39.
219 Id. at 439
220 Reeves, Inc., 447 U.S. at 439 n.12.
221 Id. at 439.
222 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
223 Id. at 99.
224 Id. at 97.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 99.
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state's designation of its activities as proprietary must be
disregarded if they are in fact regulatory in nature.
There are serious questions regarding the continued viability of
the OLC opinion. The intervening twenty year period has brought
the United States Supreme Court's opinions in Crosby v. National
Foreign Trade Council22 7 and American Insurance Association v.
Garamendi,228 as well as the United States Court of Appeals'
decision in National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios.229 These
decisions have raised significant obstacles to the intrusion of state
and local governments into the realm of foreign commerce.
Although not expressly referencing the OLC opinion, the
conclusion that inevitably flows from these opinions is an
affirmation of the limited role of both local and state governments
with respect to the exercise of proprietary powers that impact
foreign commerce.
In addition to the holdings in these cases, there is serious doubt
that the market participation doctrine is applicable to exempt state
activities from scrutiny pursuant to the Foreign Commerce Clause.
The United States Supreme Court expressly reserved this question
in Reeves and has not directly revisited the issue.23 ° However, in
National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit expressed doubt that the
Massachusetts Selective Purchasing Act was shielded from
constitutional scrutiny by a market participant exception to the
227 Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). Here, the Court
struck down the Massachusetts Selective Purchasing Act on the bases that it denied the
federal government the ability to speak with one voice with respect to foreign affairs,
and was preempted by the existing U.S. sanctions regime with respect to Burma. Id. at
380, 388.
228 539 U.S. 396 (2003). Here, the Court concluded that "a sufficiently clear
conflict" existed such as to require preemption of the California Holocaust Victim
Insurance Relief Act by executive agreements between the United States and Germany in
July 2000 relating to the settlement of unpaid claims arising from the actions of German
companies during World War H. Id. at 420.
229 181 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 1999) (striking down the Massachusetts Selective
Purchasing Act on the bases that it denied the federal government the ability to speak
with one voice with respect to foreign affairs, violated the Foreign Commerce Clause,
and was preempted by the existing U.S. sanctions regime with respect to Burma).
230 Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 n.9 (1980) ("[w]e have no occasion to
explore the limits imposed on state proprietary actions by the 'foreign commerce'
Clause").
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Foreign Commerce Clause. 231 Rather, the risk of retaliation
against the nation as a whole and the weakening of the federal
government's ability to speak with one voice in foreign affairs
militated against the extension of the exception to the Foreign
Commerce Clause.232
The application of the doctrine is further inadvisable given the
risk of retaliation by foreign powers whose companies have been
negatively affected by the operation of the divestment
legislation. 23 This retaliation could "multiply the burden on...
commerce by increasing the harm to the discriminating state. '234
These foreign powers are "unlikely to be interested in the fine
distinction between a state divestment statute that forces
[companies] to divest as a practical matter and a state regulation of
those [companies] that forces them to divest as a legal matter., 235
The re-characterization of the state's activities as regulatory or
proprietary would not serve to lessen the potential for conflict and
retaliation.236
The application of the market participation doctrine to
divestment legislation would also ignore the greater scope of the
Foreign Commerce Clause and the resultant higher standard of
proof necessary to sustain state infringements. 237 As foreign
commerce is "preeminently a matter of federal concern," any such
exception extended to a state which places a burden on foreign
commerce or foreign affairs would be narrow and judicial scrutiny
would be more rigorous.238 The Illinois Act is unlikely to survive
such scrutiny due to its conflict with federal policy, the possibility
of damage to United States foreign relations, and the ability of the
231 181 F.3d 38, 66 (1st Cir. 1999).
232 Id.
233 Kevin Lewis, Dealing with South Africa: The Constitutionality of State and
Local Divestment Legislation, 61 TUL. L. REv. 469,484 (1987).
234 Id.
235 Id. at 485.
236 Id.
237 South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 95-96 (1984); see
also Fenton, supra note 134, at 587 ("[I]t is unlikely that the Court would permit states to
insulate their actions from judicial review by imposing them through the states'
economic leverage rather than through political power.")
238 Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979).
[Vol. XXXII
2007] STATE DIVESTMENT LAWS & THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 439
federal government to speak with one voice with respect to foreign
affairs.239
Additionally, the market participation doctrine applies only in
the absence of federal action.24 ° Such was not the case with
respect to federal policy toward Sudan as memorialized in
Executive Order 13,067, the Sudan Peace Act, and the
Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act. The Illinois Act flies directly
in the face of these pronouncements by punishing commercial
activity outside the scope of federal sanctions and imposing a
significantly different state sanctions regime. Perhaps Congress
and the president could have spoken in a clearer voice with respect
to their elaboration of federal policy or expressly preempted state
divestment initiatives. Nevertheless, to permit state and local
dissonance in the presence of a federal regulatory scheme is to
invite balkanization of foreign commerce contrary to the clear
intent of the Commerce Clause.
Assuming the market participation doctrine is applicable, the
Illinois Act nevertheless fails the test for application of the
doctrine on two separate grounds. Initially, the Illinois Act is not
proprietary, as it represents an economically irrational action that
would not be taken by a private contracting party. A private
market participant would not automatically refuse to invest in a
company that does business in a particular foreign country because
of objections to that country's human rights record. Furthermore,
the Act does not confer an economic benefit upon Illinois or its
citizens. 24' To the contrary, the Act may result in the ultimate
divestment of billions of dollars in scores of profitable
239 Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983)
(providing that a state law may survive constitutional scrutiny only if it does not
implicate foreign affairs or violate a clear federal directive); see also Michelin Tire Corp.
v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976).
240 College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 684-85 (1999).
241 See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 64 (1st Cir. 1999)
(refusing to apply the market participation doctrine to the Massachusetts Selective
Purchasing Act due to the absence of provisions favoring Massachusetts' residents or
securing substantive benefits for them); see also Fenton, supra note 134, at 587
condemning divestment statutes on the basis that they lack "direct, local, economic
advancement objectives."
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companies. 42 As a result, the Act has been condemned due to the
economic harm it could cause investors as well as the costs
associated with divestment. 24 3 Illinois may suffer non-quantifiable
injury to its reputation in the national and international business
communities as a desirable location within which to do business.
These effects may be exacerbated by the fact that Illinois is among
a small number of states presently requiring divestment.
Governments act as market participants only when they make
"economically rational" decisions. 244 Economically unsound
decisions or those that would not have been reached by a private
participant constitute government regulation.245
The overbreadth of the Illinois Act also prevents the
application of the market participation doctrine. The doctrine
excludes state activities that attempt to govern "the private,
separate economic relationships of [state] trading partners. 246 The
Illinois Act attempts to govern these separate economic
relationships by mandating the severance of all commercial ties
with Sudan in order for a company to remain eligible for the
investment of state funds. All commercial relations are deemed
anathema regardless of the presence of any nexus between these
relations and the state. The sole method of avoidance of sanctions
242 See supra note 21 and accompanying text; see also Spiro, supra note 139, at 824
(condemning state divestment initiatives with respect to South Africa on the grounds that
implementation would deprive state portfolios of preferred traditional conservative
investment choices and would cause difficulty in structuring "a properly diversified and
statutorily acceptable portfolio").
243 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
244 Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1335-37 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
245 Id. There are admittedly different roles for private industry and local
governments. While profit maximization within the bounds of law provides a sensible
standard for private industry, the same cannot be said for government participants.
Rather, government participants are also charged with the duty to act as "guardians and
trustees" of the public good. While economically rational decisions presumably serve
the public good, there are other considerations like ethics and morality that may weigh
heavier on government participants than on private industry. Nevertheless, some
requirement of economic rationality must be applied to governmental participants. This
requirement is necessitated by the exemption that would be granted to activities deemed
to be market participation. If governments are to avail themselves of this broad
exemption, they must earn it by following the basic assumptions inherent in the private
marketplace.
246 S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 98-99 (1984).
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is complete withdrawal by companies seeking to remain eligible
for state investments.
The mandatory nature of the Illinois Act also bears a greater
resemblance to regulation than to market participation. A state is
not engaged in proprietary activity as a market participant "when it
dictates to a private industry how to conduct its business., 247 In a
manner similar to the statute condemned in Garamendi, the
Illinois Act pays no heed to diplomatic discretion but rather
contains elements of economic compulsion designed to coerce
companies to completely disengage from Sudan or suffer the
penalty of loss of state investment funds.248 Divestment statutes
possessing qualities of coercion, penalization, finality, and
inflexibility most likely will be viewed by courts as regulatory
rather than proprietary in nature.249
The Illinois Act is also overbroad to the extent that it attempts
to influence the political atmosphere in Sudan. Although it is
unclear what effect, if any, the Act has had or will have upon
private investment in Sudan and, consequently, the Sudanese
government, there is little doubt that it was motivated by intent to
punish the government and precipitate an end to its role in the
ongoing humanitarian crisis in Darfur. While undoubtedly a noble
purpose, an attempt by a state to exert political influence within a
foreign country exceeds the narrow scope of the market
participation doctrine. Rather, the satisfaction of state interests
unrelated to the need for commercial freedom bears greater
similarity to regulatory activity.'
Finally, the OLC opinion is limited to state and local initiatives
applying to United States-based companies. As demonstrated by
the Illinois Act and its procurement cousin, the Massachusetts
Selective Purchasing Act, state initiatives are less likely to limit
their application in such a manner. Rather, these efforts have
247 Anne R. Bowden, North Carolina's South African Divestment Statute, 67 N.C.
L. REv. 949, 961 (1989).
248 Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 423 (2003) (striking down the
California Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act on the bases that it was a regulatory
sanction, was coercive, and imposed "a different state system of economic pressure" on
insurers doing business in the state).
249 Bowden, supra note 247, at 961.
250 Lewis, supra note 233, at 486-87.
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condemned investments by companies regardless of their
nationality and thus precipitated foreign entanglements and
potential retaliation.
2. The Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore Opinion
Any discussion of the constitutionality of the Illinois Act must
include discussion of the sole United States court to directly
address the relationship between local divestment initiatives and
the federal government's authority with respect to commerce. In
Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore, the Maryland Court of
Appeals upheld an ordinance requiring the divestiture of three
municipal employee pension funds from companies doing
business in South Africa.251 The court found the ordinance to be
immune from constitutional attack on the basis of the Commerce
Clause for two reasons.
Initially, the court found divestment as mandated by the
ordinance to be shielded from constitutional scrutiny by the
market participation doctrine." 2 Based upon "the long recognized
right of a trader or manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private
business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to
parties with whom he will deal," the court concluded Baltimore
could elect not to deal with companies doing business in South
251 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989), cert. denied, Lubman v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore City, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990). Adopted in July 1986, the ordinance provided
that no funds of Baltimore's three municipal employee retirement systems were to
remain invested in or be invested in the future in banks or financial institutions that made
loans to South Africa or Namibia or companies "doing business in or with" those states.
Id. at 724 (citing BALTIMORE, MD., CODE, ORDINANCE No. 765, § 1(i) (1986)). Entities
doing business in or with South Africa or Namibia were identified through reference to
the most recent edition of the Unified List of United States' Companies with Investments
or Loans in South Africa and Namibia published annually by the Africa Fund. Id. (citing
§ l(ii)). Divestment was to be completed within a two year period commencing on
January 1, 1987. Id. (citing § 2(b)). However, the board of trustees of each of the
retirement systems could suspend divestment within this period of time through adoption
of a resolution finding that the rate of return would be substantially lower as a result of
divestment than the average of the annual earnings on the funds over the previous five
years, making divestment inconsistent with generally accepted investment standards and
causing financial losses. Id. (citing § 2(d)). The period of suspension could not exceed
ninety days, and the two year period for divestment was tolled during any suspension.
Id. (citing § 2(0).
252 Board of Trustees, 562 A.2d at 750.
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Africa "unhindered by the constraints of the Commerce Clause.,
253
The court found that the ordinance posed a lesser threat to the
"national common market" due to the absence of overtly
discriminatory measures favoring local residents.254 Additionally,
the ordinance was not punitive, as its primary purpose was
removal of "a perceived moral taint" from Baltimore's portfolio
rather than punishment of entities maintaining investments in
South Africa. 255  Rather, any sanction, to the extent such was
imposed by the ordinance, was not protracted and subject to
cessation upon the immediate termination of business relations
with South Africa.2 56 The court also distinguished the Supreme
Court's holding in South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v.
Wunnicke on the basis that Baltimore's ownership of securities
gave rise to "an ongoing commercial relationship in which the city
retain[ed] a continuing proprietary interest in the firm in which it
invests" rather than imposing conditions having a regulatory effect
outside of the market in which it participated. 257 The court also
concluded that the ordinance was not inconsistent with national
policy or the views of the federal government. 258 As a result, the
court concluded that enforcement of the ordinance was consistent
with Baltimore's interest in the proper investment of funds and did
not interfere with the private commercial transactions of affected
companies. 259 This result was obtained regardless of whether the
ordinance impacted foreign or interstate commerce.
260
Regardless of the existence and applicability of the market
participation doctrine, the court upheld the ordinance on the basis
that it could be justified by Baltimore's legitimate local interests in
253 Id. (quoting Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438-39 (1980)).
254 Id.
255 Id. at 751 (distinguishing Wis. Dep't of Indus. v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282
(1986)). In Gould, the Court struck down a Wisconsin statute prohibiting the state, for a
period of three years, from purchasing products manufactured or sold by entities to have
been found to have violated the National Labor Relations Act on the basis that the
imposition of this sanction was tantamount to regulation and not consistent with the
activities of private purchasers of services. Gould, 475 U.S. at 289.
256 Board of Trustees, 562 A.2d at 751.
257 Id. at 752.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 753.
260 Id.
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investing in a socially responsible manner, avoiding the moral
taint associated with businesses maintaining apartheid and
expressing sensitivity to the "deep feeling of [Baltimore's]
citizenry." 261 As the court found that these purposes were
legitimate, the question then became one of degree.262 The court
weighed these interests against the burden imposed on commerce
through their expression in the ordinance. 263 The issue was
whether the burden on commerce caused by the divestment
scheme was excessive in relation to Baltimore's legitimate local
interests.264 In the court's judgment, the ordinance's burden on the
sale of securities did not outweigh Baltimore's "unique and
profound local concerns. 265
Those seeking to defend the Illinois Act on the basis of the
decision in Board of Trustees should exercise considerable
caution. Leaving aside its status as a state court decision
purporting to opine on the reach of the Commerce Clause, the
opinion in Board of Trustees is a shaky precedent upon which to
rest arguments with respect to the constitutionality of the Illinois
Act. Initially, as noted with respect to the OLC opinion, there are
serious questions regarding the continued viability of the holdings
in Board of Trustees as a result of the opinions in Crosby,
Garamendi, and Natsios in the intervening twenty years. 266 While
for the most part, these opinions did not reference the holding in
Board of Trustees, the First Circuit strongly indicated its belief
that the case had been wrongly decided.267 Although the United
States Supreme Court opinions did not expressly reference nor
overrule Board of Trustees, they undoubtedly confirmed the
limited role of state and local governments with respect to foreign
commerce. It is also important to note the previous discussion
regarding the inapplicability of the market participant doctrine to
state divestment initiatives.268
261 Id. at 755.
262 Board of Trustees, 562 A.2d at 754.
263 Id. at 754-55.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 755.
266 See supra notes 227-229 and accompanying text.
267 Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 55-56 (1st Cir. 1999).
268 See supra notes 230-250 and accompanying text.
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Assuming that Board of Trustees remains viable precedent, the
ordinance it upheld can be distinguished from the Illinois Act.
The Baltimore ordinance possessed greater credibility than the
Illinois Act to the extent it identified the source to be utilized in
determining the existence of prohibited financial relations with
South Africa. By contrast, the Illinois Act leaves the
determination of sanctionable financial connections with Sudan to
an unidentified "independent researching firm." 269 These
differences also are important to the extent they permitted the
trustees of the Baltimore pension funds in question to exercise
discretion in implementing divestment.27 ° Although not expressly
permitting suspension of divestment due to conflicts with the
Commerce Clause, there was at least some ability to reconsider the
sanctions. By contrast, such discretion does not exist in the
Illinois Act, which provides no basis for exemption from
certification or suspension of divestment by the state treasurer.
Rather, the mandate of the Illinois Act is stark and unquestionably
specific. For example, the Act mandates that the completion of
divestment from "forbidden entities" was to occur by December
25, 2006.271
More importantly, as noted in Natsios, the Board of Trustees
case was mistakenly decided.272 Despite their differences, the
Baltimore ordinance and the Illinois Act have an unconstitutional
intent. The "unique and profound concerns" of state and local
governments as reflected in divestment legislation do not trump
the national interest in a unified policy with respect to economic
sanctions, including prohibitions upon investment.273 Protestations
to the contrary notwithstanding, the motivation for such legislation
is clear from their provisions. The Baltimore ordinance and
Illinois Act were aimed directly at two foreign governments
maintaining reprehensible policies. Although the Baltimore
ordinance did not expressly provide for its nullification upon the
abolition of apartheid in South Africa, it is fair to conclude that
269 Compare BALTIMORE, MD., CODE, ORDINANCE No. 765, § 1(ii) (1986) with 40
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.5(b)(5)(i-ii) (West 2002).
270 BALTIMORE, MD., CODE, ORDINANCE No. 765, § 2(d) (1986).
271 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.5(a)(3) (2006).
272 Natsios, 181 F.3d at 55-56.
273 Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 755 (Md. 1989).
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eliminating the policy that motivated the adoption of the ordinance
in the first place would cause the divestment sanction to be lifted.
The Illinois Act is more explicit than the Baltimore ordinance in
its provision creating a nexus between the lifting of the divestment
sanction and certification by the United States government that
factors motivating the imposition of federal sanctions have
ended.27 4 The intent of the Baltimore ordinance and the Illinois
Act to influence events beyond their boundaries is further evident
in the punishment meted out to those companies that fail to
comply with the mandate to withdraw from foreign countries
whose governments engage in policies lacking approval by state
and local governments. The withdrawal of these companies from
such locations will undoubtedly impact their former hosts, a result
which most certainly could not have been lost upon the Baltimore
City Council and the Illinois legislature. As noted by one
commentator, despite contentions that such laws have no influence
on the companies affected and are motivated solely by a desire to
"communicate a moral or philosophical community position," it
defies credibility to argue that state and local governments would
adopt such precise laws without intending for them to have an
effect in the target states.275
The Maryland Court of Appeals' reliance on the broad
consistency of Baltimore's divestment ordinance with federal
policy is misplaced. The court was uncertain whether the
ordinance was consistent with federal policy towards South Africa
or merely failed to frustrate congressional objectives underlying
applicable federal legislation. 276 As noted in Crosby and
Garamendi, the convergence of federal and municipal objectives
with respect to foreign affairs is irrelevant to the ultimate question
of constitutionality. 277 What is relevant to the determination of
this issue is the divergence of the selected means to accomplish
274 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.5(c) (2006).
275 Fenton, supra note 134, at 577-78.
276 See Board of Trustees, 562 A.2d at 744, 757 concluding that, to the extent the
ordinance discourages investment in South Africa, it "cannot be said to frustrate the
narrow congressional objectives" and is "'broadly consistent' with federal policy
towards South Africa."
277 Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 425 (2003); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 379 (2000).
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the common objective. To the extent Board of Trustees
subordinates such divergence to the commonality of objectives, it
has been overruled by Crosby and Garamendi. In any event,
unlike the federal laws relating to South Africa in Board of
Trustees, there is no manifest congressional intent in applicable
federal law exempting state divestment initiatives with respect to
Sudan. 8
Finally, Board of Trustees, as is undoubtedly also the case with
respect to the OLC opinion issued three years earlier, is an
outdated relic of a bygone era. It is trite but no less true to note
that the world in the twenty-first century is a far different place
than that which confronted the Maryland Court of Appeals in
1989. In Europe, a wall fell and an empire turned to dust. The
Cold War has been won as has one war in Iraq. The outcomes of a
second war in Iraq and the so-called "War on Terror" remain
uncertain. In Asia, predictions of imminent second-class status for
the U.S. economy as a result of Japanese entrepreneurialism have
been replaced by anxiety over the burgeoning economic and
military power of the awakening Chinese giant. Regardless of
location or politics, all states warily eye the incarnation of political
ideologies purportedly based on the teachings of Islam. In South
Africa, apartheid is part of the quickly receding past; its most
visible opponent having risen to the rank of president and revered
spokesperson for human rights throughout the world. In turn, the
policies of racial inequality in South Africa have been replaced by
more vicious struggles between peoples of different nationalities
and creeds as evidenced most vividly by the Balkan wars and the
genocide in Rwanda.
In their brief before the First Circuit Court of Appeals in
Natsios, seven former federal government officials responsible for
conducting United States foreign policy stated that "[i]n an era of
burgeoning international trade, economic globalization, and the
rapid movement of capital and means of production, the
importance of having a unified, coordinated international trade
policy is magnified and especially sensitive., 279 Although this
278 Board of Trustees, 562 A.2d at 743 (finding "strong evidence" that the U.S.
Congress had no intent to preempt state and local divestment initiatives directed at South
Africa).
279 See Brief of Amici Curiae William E. Brock, Samuel M. Gibbons, Alexander M.
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statement was made in the context of state procurement practices,
the same rationale applies to investment policies in the twenty-first
century. The reasoning of the Maryland Court of Appeals in
Board of Trustees must give way to the need for an uninterrupted
stream of commerce governed by unified and distinctly federal
policies in response to the irresistible forces of modem
globalization.
IV. Conclusion
The Illinois Act represents the first opportunity to examine the
consistency of state and local divestment laws with the Commerce
Clause since the decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals in
Board of Trustees. The issues presented by the Illinois Act go
directly to the heart of the Constitution, the fundamental
relationship between the federal government and the states, and
the allocation of power between them. The potential for
fragmentation of United States foreign policy must be weighed
against functions traditionally delegated to state and local
governments. The stakes in this dispute are heightened by the
millions of lives and billions of dollars at issue.
As such, there is a need for the voice of a federal court to be
heard on this issue. Commercial relations with respect to Sudan
and potentially scores of other countries should not rest on the
judgments of a single state court and legislature, no matter how
well-intended their actions. Despite state and local divestment
laws dating back to the zenith of the anti-apartheid movement in
the 1980s, there is a dearth of federal case law addressing the
consistency of such laws with constitutional mandates. Although
a clearer picture of impermissible state interference in interstate
and foreign commerce may be discerned from recent Supreme
Court case law, the precise boundaries of federal and state
authority remain indistinct. As a result, state and local
governments remain adrift to navigate the limits of their authority
in a constitutional fog. It appears that such guidance will be
forthcoming in the near future as a result of at least one recently
filed judicial challenge based, in part, upon the Commerce
Haig, Jr., Lee H. Hamilton, Carla A. Hills, George P. Shultz, and Clayton Yeutter, at 9,
Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999) (No. 98-2304).
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Clause.280
The voices of the other branches of the United States
government must also be heard. At the risk of alienating those
favoring the devolution of federal power, the Bush Administration
must articulate a position with respect to mandatory state and local
divestment initiatives. This position should emphasize the need
for national uniformity with respect to commercial relations with
foreign states and the ultimate responsibility of the executive
branch for ensuring such uniformity. Congress must also make its
will known in this area by clearly preempting state divestment
regimes in any future legislation in this area.28'
Federal administrative agencies also have a crucial role in this
area. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission
could collect and publish information about the investments and
commercial relationships of publicly traded companies in or with
Sudan and other states classified as sponsors of international
terrorism. 28 2 In order to relieve pension funds of the obligation to
investigate these investments, the United States Department of
280 Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Topinka, No. 06C-4251 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 7,
2006) (challenging the Illinois Act as an unconstitutional state interference with the
federal government's authority with respect to foreign affairs and a violation of the
Foreign Commerce and Supremacy Clauses and the National Bank Act). The plaintiffs
consist of the boards of trustees of police pension funds located in Arlington Heights,
Bloomington, Charleston, Crete, Lyons, Northlake, and Palos Hills, the board of trustees
of the firefighters' pension fund in Charleston, eight retired local police officers and
firefighters, one retired employee of the state of Illinois, and the National Foreign Trade
Council. Formed in 1914, the National Foreign Trade Council is a business organization
representing the interests of more than 300 companies. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council,
Welcome to the NFTC, http://nftc.org (last visited Mar. 5, 2007). The defendants are the
Illinois State Treasurer, the Illinois Attorney General and the Secretary of the Illinois
Department of Financial and Professional Regulation. Most recently, on October 26,
2006, U.S. District Court Judge Matthew F. Kennelly denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss for lack of standing pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See
Transcript of Proceedings on Motion to Dismiss at 2-5, Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v.
Topinka, No. 06C-4251 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 7, 2006). The plaintiffs' request for a
preliminary injunction was scheduled to be determined by January 27, 2007, as of the
time of preparation of this article.
281 The U.S. Congress eliminated the section of the Darfur Peace and Accountability
Act which provided that it did not preempt state divestment initiatives with respect to
Sudan, contained within the original version of the Act passed by the House of
Representatives, it did not expressly preempt such initiatives, thereby requiring judicial
determination of this issue. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
282 Sleeping with the Enemy, supra note 19, at 2.
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State could identify those companies whose activities are linked to
human rights violations and international terrorism. 283 This
approach would ensure that investors receive information from the
most knowledgeable and reliable source and thus do not punish
companies maintaining legal investments with no connection to
such activities.2 84
Finally, the international business community must reconsider
its continued investment in Sudan. Businesses must withhold their
support of regimes that brutalize their citizens. The public
shaming of companies through disclosure of their involvement in
Sudan by the United States Department of State or the Securities
and Exchange Commission may encourage voluntary divestment
efforts. Although not ideal or certain of success, such disclosure
and the results thereof are preferable to the continued interference
of state and local governments in foreign commerce through
mandatory divestment initiatives.
283 Id. at 2-3.
284 Id. at 3.
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